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ARTICLES
PROTECTING STATUS:
THE MORTGAGE CRISIS, EMINENT DOMAIN,
AND THE ETHIC OF HOMEOWNERSHIP
Rachel D. Godsil*
David V. Simunovich**
Homeownership is in crisis. Millions of families are at risk of
foreclosure as they are caught between declining housing values and rising
interestpayments on adjustable-ratemortgages. The primary concern for
such families is not that they will become homeless-mostfamilies who lose
their homes could afford to become renters-but rather that they will lose
their status as homeowners. Forfamilies required to sell theirproperty by
the government's use of eminent domain, a similar issue arises, as the 'fair
market value" of some homes (the standard measure of compensation) is
generally not enough to allow the family to purchase another home.
The harm of losing one's status as homeowner has afar-reachingimpact
at both the individual and collective levels. Property ownership ties one to
the larger community in myriad ways.
As compared to renters,
homeowners-even those with the same income, education, and other
socioeconomic characteristics-tendto be more civically active and more
apt to engage in market transactionslinked to their homes. Losing this link
to the larger market and community will harm a family's long-term
prospects. When many families lose these connections, whole communities
suffer.
The link between the mortgage crisis and the full-scale financial
meltdown has led to bipartisan support for a degree of government
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intervention unseen since the Great Depression. In this Article, we explore
why homeownership is so highly valued-and whether the loss of
homeownership status should impel government action. We conclude that
this loss does warrant government intervention-but also argue that the
myopicfocus on homeownership absent an adequate regulatoryregime and
a broader economic agenda has had dire effects. The families caught by
the subprime mortgage debacle were often targeted by predatory lenders
because of their membership in vulnerable groups. The government's
failure to prevent this exploitative behavior then requires its intervention
now. However, it is crucial to ensure that government intervention does not
create insurmountable barriers to entry for aspiringhomeowners or moral
hazard. Accordingly, our status-preservationistapproach would protect
only those who would have received loans had sound lending practices
been utilized and would counsel against the view that homeownership alone
is adequate to ensure healthy communities. Rather, homeownership has in
the past been linked to behaviors that create sound communities. In the
context of eminent domain, the argumentfor status preservation is even
stronger, as it is justified by the U.S. Supreme Court's maxim that
compensation should be based on fair market value unless doing so "would
result in manifest injustice to owner or public."
We conclude by
consideringthe broader implications of the economic meltdown and reflect
on whether it has so permanently alteredour conception of homeownership
that homeowner status is in the process of losing its value.
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INTRODUCTION

The loss of one's home triggers powerful emotions. Our homes are often
the locus of our families and communities. They are akin, some scholars
suggest, to a diary, a family album, or a wedding ring.' A home is not
merely a fungible piece of property easily replaced by another. This set of
ideas helps explain part of the political response to the mortgage crisis as
well as the criticisms of the current degree of compensation paid to those
whose homes are forcibly bought by the government when it exercises its
power of eminent domain. In this Article, we are concerned with perhaps
an even more profound loss: the loss of one's status as a homeowner.
This loss is implicitly assumed for many families caught by the subprime
mortgage debacle-if their homes are foreclosed upon as a result of an
inability to pay their mortgages, their ability to obtain another mortgage to
purchase a home is severely compromised. The impetus for government
action to assist families in these situations (by providing short-term loans,
fixing their interest rate, or some other means) is generally not seen as an
effort to prevent families from becoming homeless-but rather to enable
them to continue to own their homes.
For families confronting the government's exercise of eminent domain, a
similar issue may arise. The "fair market value" of some homes (all that the
government is generally required to compensate), will not be enough to
allow the family to purchase another home-except possibly in another
neighborhood so deeply troubled as to render it almost unlivable and
vulnerable to future uses of eminent domain. In these circumstances, the
government's use of eminent domain will have the effect of casting families
from the "ownership society" and causing them to lose access to the social
2
and pecuniary benefits afforded property owners.
In the Article, we explore whether this loss of homeowner status should
in fact impel government action. We conclude, with some caveats, that it
should. The families caught by the subprime mortgage debacle were often
targeted by predatory lenders as a result of membership in vulnerable
groups, and the government's failure to regulate the banking industry
provides strong justification for government action. However, we would
argue that the myopic focus on homeownership has serious shortcomings
1. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957,
967 (1982).
2. Our argument is focused upon the loss of homeowner status but is not intended to
suggest that renters may not experience losses from the use of eminent domain that are
substantial and worth compensating. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
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that are now vividly apparent. In the context of eminent domain, the
argument for status preservation is even stronger. The loss of homeowner
status, to us, seems to meet the U.S. Supreme Court's maxim that fair
market value should apply unless "its application would result in manifest
'3
injustice to owner or public."
The harm of losing one's status as homeowner has a far-reaching impact
at both the individual and collective levels. Property ownership ties one to
the larger community in myriad ways. Homeowners-even those with the
same income, education, and other socioeconomic characteristics-tend to
be both more civically active and more apt to engage in market transactions
linked to their homes. 4 This involvement often stems from their financial
obligations and vulnerability, but it has the effect of creating stronger and
more cohesive communities with salutary effects both for their communities
and themselves. According to Carol Rose, "[d]espite its appeal to selfinterest, commerce also carries a culture:
it inculcates rules,
understandings, and standards of behavior enforced by reciprocity of
advantage. To do business, one must learn the ways and practices of
others

....

-"5 Losing this link to the larger market and community is likely

to harm a family and its long-term prospects far more than even the
emotional loss of the home.
The potential responses to the subprime mortgage crisis are debated daily
in major newspapers and by different political actors, and we will discuss
the various arguments currently underway-even as this Article goes to
press new proposals are emerging. The issues as applied to eminent domain
are more often explored in academic scholarship. Property scholars have
expended considerable energy determining when compensation to
homeowners subject to the government's power of eminent domain is
"just."'6 The theories of compensation have considered the need to fully

compensate property owners for their loss, discourage inefficient takings,
mitigate what would otherwise be an onerous individual burden to bear for
the public benefit, and introduce elements of distributive justice into a
process that has disproportionately burdened stigmatized groups. 7 Our
Article will evaluate these standards proposed as replacements for the fair
3. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
4. Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property as Entrance,91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1950 (2005).
5. CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 147 (1994).
6. See generally Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for
Reform, 46 S.C. L. REV. 579 (1995); Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for
Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 110 (2002). But see Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation,

13

J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES

29 (2003) (arguing for downward adjustment in compensation

to combat moral hazard); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected PoliticalEconomy of Eminent
Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 104 (2006) (noting that many scholars have "overstate[d]
the [compensation] problem").
7. Stigmatized group in this context refers to "minority groups in the United States
victimized by social stigma," which includes racial and ethnic minorities, and more broadly,
the poor, the elderly, and politically disempowered groups. Shavar D. Jeffries, The
Structural Inadequacy of Public Schools for Stigmatized Minorities: The Need for
InstitutionalRemedies, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 2 n.1 (2006).
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market standard. Unlike many other commentators, we are not taking the
position that compensation should be a tool to impede the use of eminent
domain. Rather, for the purposes of this Article, we accept that the
government may have good reason to use its power either for a specific
public use, such as to build a school or highway or to revitalize an
economically distressed municipality. We will note when a particular
proposed compensation scheme would seem likely to be so expensive as to
render impossible the government's use. In other words, we are not
attempting to manipulate compensation to render the use of eminent domain
prohibitively expensive. It is our intention to evaluate compensation
schemes to ensure a degree of compensation that protects against the loss of
homeowner status.
We recognize that the protection of homeowner status as such reifies an
existing hierarchy that is problematic in some respects. Homeowners are
afforded both significant monetary benefits and social capital that renters
are denied. In this Article, with some hesitance, we develop a theory that
justifies government action (which practically will be financed by all
taxpayers, including renters) to prevent widespread foreclosures and to
measure homeowner compensation in the eminent domain context by some
metric other than fair market value. We acknowledge that homeowners are
currently privileged within our society-and at bottom, we want to ensure
that the most vulnerable of those who have attained the status of
homeowner retain that status. Our model therefore is progressive and
redistributive within the category of homeowners even while we are
cognizant that our theory is arguably at the expense of those who are
presently excluded from this category. To support our model, we look to
the theoretical underpinning of common-law protection of statusparticularly in the law of defamation.
We begin this Article by exploring the current nature of homeownership
and the catalysts for the current sense that homeowners are at risk. Part I of
the Article describes who among Americans are homeowners and the
government's role both in increasing the homeownership rate and
subsidizing those who own their homes through tax policy. This part
assesses the interplay of class and race within the contexts of both the
mortgage crisis and eminent domain. Part II considers the justifications for
according increased status to homeowners and the empirical studies
suggesting the private and public benefits of homeownership. Part III
explores the jurisprudence and scholarship of just compensation through the
lens of status preservation. Part IV then analyzes the panoply of federal and
state government proposals to address the mortgage crisis and whether
protecting current homeowners will create undue barriers to entry for
aspiring homeowners. Finally, in Part V, we question whether the volatility
of the housing market and the easy availability of credit have so altered the
nature of homeownership that its status has been changed forever and we
consider a new line of scholarship that advocates a wholesale
reconceptualization of homeownership.

[Vol. 77
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I. HOMEOWNERSHIP AND ANXIETY
We are experiencing a political moment in which homeownership- 8
among our most hallowed institutions-is seen as dangerously precarious.
The wave of anxiety began with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kelo
v. City of New London,9 holding that governments were entitled to take
private homes when the city embarked upon economic development
plans.' 0 This anxiety was further exacerbated by the ravages of Hurricane
Katrina and has been ignited yet again by the mortgage foreclosure crisis.
The latter potentially affects an extraordinary number of households.
Mortgage analysts project that as many as "three million subprime
mortgages could end up in foreclosure over the next several years.""II
Few are immune when homeownership is perceived to be threatened.
Even the vast majority of those who do not yet own their own homes, not
surprisingly, aspire to this goal. Along with the obvious benefits of paying
monthly to increase one's own equity rather than enriching a landlord, our
culture attributes considerable virtue to homeowners: we believe that they
take better care of their property, play more active roles in local governance
and schools, vote more frequently, participate in local community building,
and in general, constitute more active citizens. 12 As individuals, we value
our own homes enormously. For most of us, our home is our single most
valuable asset as well as the locus of our family and community. As
Margaret Radin famously articulated, the home is part of "the way we
constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world."'1 3 We
which likely
attach to our homes deep psychological and emotional value,
14
translates into the "price" at which we would sell our homes.
In addition to its psychological dimensions, homeownership has
significant financial benefits. It permits the owner to leverage capital,
which can help to buy investment properties, start a new business, send a
Because we value
child to college, or save for retirement. 15
homeownership and homeowners, the government entitles homeowners to a
generous array of benefits, including mortgage and property tax deductions

8. D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 255, 25556 (2006).
9. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
10. Seeid. at488-89.
11. Edmund L. Andrews, Relief for Homeowners is Given to a Relative Few, N.Y.

Mar. 4, 2008, at C7.
12. Pefialver, supra note 4, at 1949.
13. Radin, supra note 1, at 959.

TIMES,

14. TIMOTHY SANDEFUR,

CORNERSTONE

OF LIBERTY:

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 21ST-

CENTURY AMERICA 5-10, 12, 21-30 (2006) (recounting a variety of reasons why owners
develop special bonds to a home they live in, and why that relationship should be protected
by the government).
15. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN

THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 6 (2000). Throughout his book, Hernando De Soto

demonstrates the transformative power of asset ownership in a functioning capitalist society,
and the necessity for an ordered, coherent property system to facilitate wealth accumulation.
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and protection from creditors. For many of us, the step of becoming a
homeowner is among the most significant of our lives.
Homeownership here obviously means more than simply the material
fact of owning a piece of property. Instead, when we say homeowners
occupy a particularly valued status within American society, we are using
the term status in two separate ways. Most obviously, a homeowner is a
person in the position (status) of owning a home-a merely descriptive
understanding of status. The weightier use of the word connotes a
particular social position in which a person who owns a home is ascribed
6
1
greater worth than one who does not.
The assumption that property owners have greater worth than those
without has a long vintage-and underlies many societies' (including early
American) property requirements for voting. In support of the link between
property and the right to vote, John Adams argued,

Is it not equally true, that Men in general in every Society, who are
wholly destitute of Property, are also too little acquainted with public
Affairs to form a right Judgment, and too dependent upon other Men to
have a Will of their own? If this is a Fact, if you give to every Man, who
has no Property, a Vote, will you not make a fine encouraging Provision
for Corruption by your fundamental Law? Such is the Frailty of the
human Heart, that very few Men, who have no Property, have any
Judgment of their own. They talk and vote as they are directed by Some
Man of Property, who has attached their Minds to his Interest. 17

While the express link between political voice and property has long
been rejected, the government nonetheless generously subsidizes

16. The uses of the word "status" are many and varied. According to Sir Henry Sumner
Maine,

Status, a much discussed term which, according to the best modem expositions,
includes the sum total of a man's personal rights and duties, or, to be verbally
accurate, of his capacity for rights and duties. It is curious that the word "estate,"
which is nothing but the French form of "status," should have come to stand over
against it in an almost opposite category. A man's estate is his measurable
property; what we call his status is his position as a lawful man, a voter, and so
forth. The liability of every citizen to pay rates and taxes is a matter of status;
what a given citizen has to pay depends on his estate, or portions of it assigned as
the measures of particular imposts. we have, too, an "estate" in land, which so far
preserves the original associations of "status" that, as we have just noted, contract
may not alter its incidents or nature. Again, as Professor Maitland has pointed out,
the Roman Status has also become the State of modem public law, and in that form
has refused to be reduced to a species of contract by the ingenious efforts of
individualist philosophers, notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of the
Social Contract for a century or more.
SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 184-85 n.L (London, John Murray 1906)
(citations omitted). Its more modem usage is often attributed to Max Weber. See MAX
WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 305-07 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
17. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 394, 394-96 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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homeownership in our tax policy, and those who are homeowners continue
to be assumed to be particularly valuable civic members.
The notion that there is a lurking danger of losing our homes is therefore
a powerful catalyst for political action. And right now, the possibility of
losing our homes as a result of natural disaster, mortgage foreclosure, or
perhaps most insidiously, as a result of an express political decision that
one's property will garner more social utility as a shopping mall seems
quite real to many Americans.
A. Who Owns Their Homes?
In 2006, 68% of all American households owned their homes. This
category includes significant percentages of Americans at every income
level, though not surprisingly, the homeownership rate increases with
affluence. 18
Homeownership by Household Income Level
(calculated from 2005)
Household Income

% Owner-Occupied

$5000 to $9999

42.5

$10,000 to $14,999
$15,000 to $19,999

51.8
53.3

$20,000 to $24,999
$25,000 to $29,999
$30,000 to $34,999

55.5
56.0

$35,000 to $39,999
$40,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $59,999
$60,000 to $79,999
$80,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $119,000
$120,000 or more

TOTAL

60.8
62.5
69.8
74.4
81.1
85.3
89.6
92.6

68.8

This high rate of homeownership is largely a product of the federal
government's decision beginning in the post-World War II era to subsidize
homeownership for the middle class. These efforts included the Federal

18. For a discussion of class and homeownership, see Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the
American Dream (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Brown includes a table of
homeownership rates by adjusted gross income with data from 2003. We have updated her
list with data from 2005.
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Housing Administration (FHA) and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) homeownership loan programs, which guaranteed 90% of the value of
a home as collateral for loans from private banks. 19 The FHA and VA
programs allowed new purchasers to provide only a 10% down payment (as
opposed to earlier norms of at least 33% to as much as 50% down). 20 The
programs also allowed for longer repayment periods, which reduced
monthly payments. 2 1 Between 1934 and 1969, the percentage of American
homeowners increased by almost 50%, from 44% to 63% of all
22
households.
The federal government continues to encourage and subsidize
homeownership in a variety of ways. The Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) now provides programs to help low and
moderate income families purchase homes. 23 Most significantly, perhaps,
homeowners are entitled to deduct both the amount they pay in real
property taxes and interest paid on a mortgage secured by a personal
residence. 24 In addition, imputed rental income is not considered income
25
for tax purposes and therefore is not taxed.
As Dorothy Brown persuasively argues, the federal government's
subsidization of current homeownership does not benefit all homeowners
equally. 26 First, the deductions increase in value as a household's taxable
income increases:
[A] taxpayer in the 35 percent marginal tax bracket, saves 35 cents for
every dollar of mortgage interest deduction. Her after tax costs of a $1
mortgage payment would be 65 cents. On the other hand a taxpayer in the
15 percent marginal tax bracket, saves 15 cents for every dollar of

mortgage interest deduction.

27
payment would be 85 cents.

Her after tax costs of a $1 mortgage

Second, and even more significantly, homeowners who do not itemize
their taxes do not benefit at all from the mortgage interest and real property
tax deductions-and only one-third of all tax payers itemize their taxes. 2 8
Therefore, a significant percentage of homeowners do not benefit from the
government subsidies. And, of course, renters cannot deduct their housing
19. See Rachel D. Godsil, Viewing the Cathedralfrom Behind the Color Line: Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L.J. 1807, 1847 (2004)
(discussing the National Housing Act of 1937 and the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of

1944); U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Census of Housing Tables-Homeownership,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html
2008).

(last visited Nov. 13,

20. Godsil, supra note 19, at 1847-48.
21. Id. at 1848.
22. Id.
23. See generally U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Homes and
Communities, http://www.hud.gov (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
24. Brown, supra note 18, at 6 (citing I.R.C. § 163(h) (West Supp. 2008)).

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
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expenses, and other borrowers (even for expenses such as student loans) are
not entitled to deduct interest expenditures at all. These tax advantages for
those homeowners who itemize their taxes are valuable indeed: for fiscal
year 2007, they are estimated to be worth $125 billion.29 President-elect
Barack Obama has proposed a change to this approach. During his
campaign, he unveiled a plan to institute a universal mortgage credit that
would give all homeowners-not just those who itemize their taxes-the
30
opportunity to benefit from their ownership status.
Along with class disparities in homeownership rates, there are
considerable racial disparities. White households are most likely to own
homes-with 75% of whites owning in contrast to 60% of Asian
Americans, 58% of American Indians and Native Alaskans, 49% of
Latinos, and 48% of blacks. 3 1 The dramatic differences in the race of
homeowners are not accidental. They can be traced in large part to the very
federal programs that made mass homeownership possible. The FHA and
VA refused to extend mortgage guarantees to black families or to
neighborhoods in which blacks had a significant presence. This contributed
to concurrent private sector lending discrimination. 3 2 Notably, while the
racial disparities appear stark, they actually reflect the highest
homeownership rate for blacks and Latinos, and the smallest racial gap in
33
our country's history.
The current racial disparities in homeownership rates are not only a
byproduct of historical discrimination. Thomas Shapiro has found that
blacks are rejected for home mortgages at a 60% higher rate than equally
creditworthy whites. 34 While the Community Reinvestment Act 35 has had
some effect by requiring banks doing business in urban communities to
meet their credit needs, Shapiro concludes that financial institutions simply
redefine "objective" criteria that result in blacks being denied credit at
substantially higher rates. 36 In addition, blacks and Latinos tend to have
significantly less family wealth to rely upon for down payments and the like

29. Id. at 7 (citing JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005-2009, at 33, available at http://www.house.

gov/jct/s-l-05.pdf.
30. Edmund L. Andrews, The Housing-Loan Crisis,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2008, at WK6;
see also Barack Obama and Joe Biden:
The Change We Need, Economy,
http://barackobama.com/issues/economy/index.php#home-ownership (last visited Nov. 13,
2008).
31. U.S. Census Bureau, Homeownership Rates by Race and Ethnicity of Householder:
1994 to 2006, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annua06/ann6t2O.html (last
visited Nov. 13, 2008).
32. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 30 (1995).
33. Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y

53 (2006).
34. Id. at 66.
35. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006).
36. See Shapiro, supra note 33, at 66-67.
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so these minorities often have to pay higher interest rates and costs. 37
These facts have significance for both the mortgage crisis and eminent
domain.
Indeed, even the symbolic significance of homeownership may have
unique salience for blacks and Latinos in light of the United States' history
of exclusion. As Irma Mufioz, a Senior Manager with Fannie Mae,
described,
I would give speeches on wealth building and about the impact that
home ownership has on communities, but I never truly understood what I
was saying until very recently. Two years ago, my siblings and I bought
our parents their first home in the United States. Soon after they moved
in, we were having dinner together. I had never seen as much peace in
my parents' eyes as I saw that night. I had never seen them as happy as
they were. Home ownership did that for them. After they became
homeowners, they became voters. They are involved in the community.
They participate in the school system. They advocate for other Latinos in
the area. And after September 11, my parents' house instantly had an
American flag on the garage door.
My parents feel fully like a part of this country. Home ownership
was
38
the catalyst to make sure that they felt like part of the United States.
B. Mortgage Crisis
Homeownership has reached historic levels in part because lenders
extended home loans to borrowers who offered little or no down payment.
The reduced down payment requirements have significantly lowered
barriers to homeownership-which until the financial walls came crashing
down seemed to be a positive outcome. However, without a substantial
down payment, homeowners began their tenure with a significantly higher
debt load, rendering them acutely sensitive to market fluctuations. The
risks (and rewards) of exposure to market fluctuations can be demonstrated
by a simple example.
Suppose that the Johnson family purchases a $200,000 home with a 20%
down payment ($40,000) and a loan for $160,000. The Robertson family
also purchases a $200,000 home, but instead pays only 1% down ($2000),
and obtains a loan for $198,000. If home prices increase and each home is
now worth $220,000, the Robertsons and the Johnsons have (at least on
paper) gained $20,000. The Johnson family earned the $20,000 return on a
$40,000 investment; the Robertsons earned the $20,000 return on a $2000
investment. The Johnson family provided a larger down payment and
earned a 50% return on investment; the Robertson family purchased their
home with a lower down payment so they benefit from a 1000% return on
investment. In this situation, the Robertsons are in a better position than the

37. See id. at 67.
38. Sixth Annual HarvardLatino Law and Policy Conference: Latino Leadership and
Collective Power, 7 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 75, 93 (2004).
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Johnsons because they have been able to reap the same financial reward
with significantly less money up front.
Just as the Robertsons will have greater exposure to market appreciation,
so too will they be more exposed to home price depreciation. If housing
prices decline 10%, then the value of each home in our example will be
reduced by $20,000, bringing the fair market value of each home to
$180,000. The Johnsons, because of their large down payment, still have
positive equity in their home. That is, the home is worth $180,000, but they
only owe the lender $160,000. If the Johnson family has to sell the home in
this down market, they will not owe the lender any additional money at
closing (though they will of course lose half of their initial investment, or
$20,000). The Johnsons' ability to pay a larger down payment provides
them with a cushion against declining prices since they will not have to pay
anything out of pocket to the lender if the home sells below its purchase
price.
The Robertson family, however, is not as fortunate. Assume the value of
their home has also declined in value by $20,000, and they too sell their
home. The Robertsons have borrowed $198,000, but their home sells for
only $180,000. Unlike the Johnson family, the Robertsons must put
forward a significant amount of money ($18,000 in this example) to sell
their home and repay the lender. This simple example demonstrates how
leveraging a relatively small down payment (that is, using $2000 to borrow
$198,000) means that the Robertson family will be more exposed to
fluctuations (either up or down) in housing prices.
Understanding the connection between declining housing prices and
highly leveraged loans is critical to examining the mortgage crisis.
Nationally, housing prices declined 10% in 2006, and experts predict an
additional 15% to 20% drop in prices in the near future. 39 The weakened
housing market means that more than 10% of all homeowners owe their
lenders more than the fair market value of their homes 40 (they are in
situations similar to that of the Robertsons in the down market). As
demonstrated above, the declining prices will likely have the greatest
impact on homeowners who have the least amount of equity in their homes
(i.e., those who provided nominal down payments, obtained interest-only
mortgages, or those who have not built up equity through mortgage
payments). The significance of this reality to the current mortgage crisis
cannot be understated. Nearly 30% of all home loans in 2007 were
originated with no down payment; 4 1 among borrowers who did provide a

39. Martin Feldstein, How to Stop the Mortgage Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2008, at
A15.
40. Edmund L. Andrews & Louis Uchitelle, Rescues Weighed as Homeowners Wallow
in Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, at Al.
41. John Leland, FacingDefault, Some Abandon Homes to Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29,
2008, at Al.
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down payment, the average payment has decreased more than 50% in the
42
past 20 years.
While many homeowners are at risk, those who received subprime
loans 43 are truly in crisis. 44 Recipients of subprime loans invariably pay
higher interest rates because they are seen as greater credit risks and they
often were induced to borrow with no money down, initially low-interest
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) loans, and sometimes, interest-only
payment plans. The effect of housing value depreciation then is even more
dire for subprime borrowers. The subprime borrower has likely paid less
principal in the early years of her tenure as a homeowner, and therefore, is
more likely to have negative equity in a down market.
42. Id.
43. A subprime mortgage loan is one that fails to meet the criteria for "prime"
mortgages, and is determined to have a lower expected probability of full repayment.
Creditors ostensibly make this assessment according to "the borrower's credit record and
score, debt service-to-income (DTI) ratio, and/or the mortgage loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.
Borrowers with low credit scores, DTIs above 55%, and/or LTVs over 85% are likely to be
considered subprime." John Kiff & Paul Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free:
Recent Developments in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets 3 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. 07/188, 2007), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp
/2007/wp07188.pdf In general, because they are seen as a greater credit risk, subprime
borrowers pay higher interest rates, which translate into higher monthly costs. Lenders
devised a series of instruments to incentivize subprime borrowers. The most well-known is
the "adjustable rate mortgage" (ARM). An ARM refers to a loan for which the interest rate
changes periodically, usually in relation to an index, and payments may go up or down
accordingly. ARMs are problematic for subprime borrowers for many reasons, but mainly
because the monthly payments can fluctuate dramatically, leading to "payment shock" as the
initial low interest rate increases. FED. RESERVE BD., CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON
ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES (2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/

arms/armsbrochure.pdf. ARMs often seem attractive at first blush because of their stated
lower interest rates, but they are often accompanied by "points," or loan fees. Id. at 27. A
subprime loan also is more likely to have a prepayment penalty, a balloon payment, or both.
A prepayment penalty is a fee assessed against the borrower for paying off the loan earlyeither because the borrower sells the house or refinances the high-rate loan. A mortgage
with a balloon payment requires the borrower to pay off the entire outstanding amount in a
lump sum after a certain period has passed, often five years. If the borrower cannot pay the
entire amount when the balloon payment is due, the borrower has to refinance the loan or
sell the house. Id. at 20.
44. The causes of the subprime financial crisis are hotly disputed. Some claim that the
confluence of falling home prices and skyrocketing interest rate increases for ARMs resulted
in an unexpectedly high number of defaults. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial
Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown (Duke Law Sch. Legal Studies,
Research Paper No. 175, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1056241.
Other
scholars disagree. See Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis (Aug. 19, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law
Review), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020396 ("[T]he quality of loans deteriorated
for six consecutive years before the crisis and securitizers were, to some extent, aware of it.
We provide evidence that the rise and fall of the subprime mortgage market follows a classic
lending boom-bust scenario, in which unsustainable growth leads to the collapse of the
market. Problems could have been detected long before the crisis, but they were masked by
high house price appreciation between 2003 and 2005."). Some place primary blame on the
mortgage industry. Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico argues, "[tlhe mortgage crisis
was not caused by the people who purchased homes but by how homes were financed." Bill
Richardson, Bring It Back to the Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at WK13.
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Consider again the Johnsons and the Robertsons. The Johnsons paid
20% down ($40,000) on their $200,000 home and obtained a $160,000
mortgage for the remainder of the purchase price. Assume that the
Johnsons obtained a thirty-year mortgage in which the payments remain
constant throughout the terms of the loan (thirty-year fixed). At an interest
rate of 6%, 45 the Johnsons would pay roughly $960 per month. 46 After one
year, the Johnsons have reduced the principal loan amount by roughly
$2000; after three years, the principal is reduced by $7000. 4 7 This total cost
is significantly lower than either of the alternatives below, and demonstrates
the benefits of a conventional loan combined with a large down payment.
After thirty years, the total cost of owning their home (that is, the cost of the
thirty-year fixed mortgage and the $40,000 down payment) would be
$385,341.
On the other hand, the Robertsons only paid 1% down ($2000) on their
$200,000 home, and obtained a $198,000 mortgage for the remainder of the
purchase price. They obtained a thirty-year mortgage with a fixed interest
rate for the first five years of the loan; the loan adjusts every year after that
initial five-year period (5/1 ARM). At an interest rate of 6.375%, the
monthly payments during the first year are roughly $1235; $1051 of that
pays down interest, and $184 pays down the principal loan amount. After
one year, the Robertsons have reduced the principal loan amount by
roughly $2200; after three years, the principal loan amount is reduced by
roughly $7000. Similar to the Johnsons, the Robertsons are reducing their
principal loan amount with each payment; this builds the positive equity in
the home, and buffers the family against possible declines in the value of
the home should they need to sell in a down market. However, the
Robertsons (unlike the Johnsons) are subject to the added risk of interest
rate increases after the first five years. The total cost of purchasing the
home with this loan (again, the cost of the mortgage and the $2000 down
payment) would be $535,608.48
Alternatively, assume the Robertsons obtained a more exotic loan. In
this example, they obtain a thirty-year loan that offers interest-only
payments for the first three years, and payments composed of principal plus
45. See Bankrate.com, http://www.bankrate.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2008) (noting
banks offering, on March 15, 2008, thirty-year fixed rate mortgages at 6% interest for
borrowers with good credit ratings and 20% down). The interest rates in each of the
subsequent examples were also obtained via Bankrate.com. The actual interest rate is
irrelevant, however, as the examples are meant to demonstrate the relative effects on the
principal loan amount and the total cost of the mortgage over the course of the mortgage.
46. Bloomberg, Bloomberg.com:
Calculators, http://www.bloomberg.com/invest/
calculators/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2008) (offering a variety of fixed rate, adjustable
rate, and interest-only loan calculators).
47. More specifically, the Johnsons would pay $959.28 each month; in the first year of
the loan, this means that roughly $800 would pay down interest on the loan, and $159 would
reduce the principal amount of the loan. After one year, the principal loan amount would be
$158,035; after three years, the principal loan amount would be $153,734.
48. It is impossible to estimate the precise cost of any ARM because the interest rates
fluctuate; the overall cost of the loan assumes a 25 basis point increase from year to year.
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an interest rate that adjusts each year after the initial three-year period
(three-year interest-only ARM). At a rate of 6.5%, the Robertsons would
pay $1070 per month. After three years, they have not reduced the
principal loan amount at all-though the lower payments in the first three
years save the Robertsons nearly $6000 compared to the payments under
the 5/1 ARM. After the initial three-year period, and assuming a 25 basis
point (0.25%) increase in the interest rate, 49 the monthly mortgage
payments would jump to $1330. In this situation, the Robertsons are
exposed to higher interest rates and have no built-in cushion of equity in the
home should the family need to sell in a down market. Of the three options
discussed here, the three-year interest-only ARM is clearly the most
expensive means of purchasing the home, with the total cost of purchasing
the home reaching $575,491.
50
As of September 2008, a record 1.2 million homes were in foreclosure.
Equally troubling, there were 490,000 foreclosure proceedings initiated
between April and June of 2008 (an increase of 9% from January 2008
through March 2008); 2.9 million homeowners were behind on their
payments (up 25% from the same period last year). 5 1 Subprime ARMs
accounted for roughly 36% of all foreclosure starts between April and June,
despite that they account for only 6% of all mortgages.5 2 At these rates, a
subprime ARM is 20 times more likely to end up in foreclosure than a
standard thirty-year fixed rate prime mortgage. 53 These stark numbers are
driven in part by the substantial and sustained depreciation in housing
prices. As housing prices decline, sale is not a viable exit option for a
homeowner who, for whatever reason, is unable to continue meeting her
monthly mortgage payments. This is essentially the problem of the
Robertson family in a down market. The scope of this problem is startling:
30% of families holding subprime mortgages are currently "upside
down"-meaning they owe more on the loan than the home is worth. 54 As
the economy continues to worsen and more employers shed workers, the
pressure on "upside down" homeowners will mount as workers will often
need to relocate to secure employment.
The subprime mortgage crisis will fall most heavily on black and Latino
homeowners. Blacks and Latinos are more likely than whites-even when
controlling for comparable income-to receive subprime loans. 55 That
49. Again, this is only an assumption; the precise increase or decrease is largely
irrelevant for this hypothetical.
50. Les Christie, Record 1.2 Million Homes Hit by Foreclosure,CNNMoNEY.coM, Sept.

5, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/05/realestate/foreclosures rise again/index.htm.
51. Id.
52. Id. Subprime mortgages accounted for more than 50% of all foreclosure starts in
2007. Jim Zarroli, Bernanke Urges Banks to Help BorrowersMore, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, Mar.
4, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=87898693.

53. Id.
54. Andrews, supra note 11.
55. Brown, supra note 18, at 26; see Paul S. Calem, Kevin Gillen & Susan M. Wachter,
The NeighborhoodDistributionof Subprime Mortgage Lending (Univ. of Pa., Inst. for Law
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blacks and Latinos, on average, have lower median household wealth than
whites makes it more likely that black and Latino homeowners will default
when ARMs reset at higher rates.5 6 A recent study revealed that in 2006
nearly 50% of home loans given to blacks, and slightly more than 40% of
those given to Latinos, were subprime. 5 7 By contrast, less than 20% of the
loans to white borrowers were subprime. 58 More localized data reveal
some markets with significantly higher proportions of subprime loans. For
example, Michigan 59 and Wisconsin had the highest proportion of subprime
loans to blacks, with these high cost debts accounting for 70.7% and 61.6%,
respectively, of mortgage loans to black borrowers in 2006.60
Unsurprisingly, a high percentage of subprime loans can also be found in
counties with poverty rates that are above a state's average. In Texas, for
example, subprime loans account for slightly more than 16% of all home
loans; however, in thirty counties that have poverty rates above the state
average, subprime loans account for half of all home loans. 6 1
C. Eminent Domain
The current political focus on the mortgage crisis was presaged by the
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo. In the aftermath of the
decision, there was a common perception that governments were engaged in
widespread abuse of eminent domain, rendering property rights essentially
meaningless. The post-Kelo reaction was a furious spate of legislative
enactments and even a few state constitutional amendments prohibiting the

& Econ., Research Paper No. 03-39, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=478581;
Richard Marsico, The Higher Cost of Being African-American or Latino: Subprime Home
Mortgage Lending in New York City, 2004-2005 (N.Y. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal
Theory, Research
Paper No. 07/08-12,
2007), available at http://ssm.com
/abstract= 1034265.

56. Christopher L. Peterson, Over-Indebtedness, Predatory Lending, and the
International Political Economy of Residential Home Mortgage Securitization: Comparing
the United States' Subprime Home Mortgage Lending Crisis to Home Finance in the United
Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, at n.4 (Jan. 11, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Fordham Law Review), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-1 083184.
57. Alan Zibel, 40 Percent of Mortgages Given to Blacks, Hispanics 'High Cost,' S.
FLA. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.sfltimes.com/index.php?option=comcontent&

task-view&id=595&Itemid=38.
58. Id.
59. Evidence is surfacing that suggests that Michigan lenders "steered minority
homeowners into high-risk subprime mortgages." Eric Campbell, Cox's Ties to Mortgage
Firms May Explain Inaction on Foreclosures, MICH. CITIZEN, Mar. 2, 2008, at Al.

"Homeowners in the primarily Black Detroit neighborhood, with a median income of
$49,000, received subprime loans at a rate of 70%[;] in the mostly white Plymouth
neighborhood, with a median income of $51,000, subprime loans reached only 17%." Id.
60. Al Heavens, Mortgage Lending to Minorities Drops in 2006, REALTY TIMES, Oct.
11, 2007, http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20071011 mortgagelending.htm.
61. Shawnda Hines, Poorest Counties Hardest Hit by Mortgage Crises, REUTERS, Feb.
27,

2008,

20080227.

http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS

189623+27-Feb-2008+PRN
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use of eminent domain for all but the most traditional public uses.62 Unlike
the mortgage crisis, which is rooted in a real threat to many homes, the Kelo
For most
perception was mainly a result of overheated rhetoric.
homeowners, Kelo changed very little.
Property rights have never been as static and "secure" as many presume.
As law students learn their first year, ownership is not a single concept.
Rather, property rights consist of a bundle of rights or entitlements to
occupy and use property, to exclude others from it, and to transfer the
property to others. Property rights are (and always have been) limited by
the interests of others in countless respects. Neighbors may sue in nuisance
to limit offensive conduct, local government can limit uses under zoning
and land use regulations, and, most dramatically, government may require
sale of land for its own use. While most limits upon property receive
widespread support from citizens (and law students), this last limit, the
government's power of eminent domain, is a source of considerable anger
and anxiety.
The use of eminent domain in fact is not widespread 63 and, in the
unlikely event that the government acquires one's home for a highway or a
park or to spark economic activity, most homeowners will be well
compensated and easily able to purchase another home. With some
frequency, homeowners receive significantly more than market value as
developers seek to avoid controversy and litigation by negotiating early
purchases. 64 For some, the degree of compensation fails to alleviate the

62. See Amanda W. Goodin, Note, Rejecting the Return to Blight in Post-Kelo State
Legislation, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 193-98 (2007).

63. Among the most vocal critics of the use of eminent domain, Dana Berliner
documents a recent five-year period that included 10,282 actual or "threatened" takings
across all fifty states and the District of Columbia. See DANA BERLINER, CASTLE COAL.,
PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN:

ABUSE

OF EMINENT

DOMAIN

A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE

2

(2003),

available at

http://castlecoalition.org/pdf/

report/EDjreport.pdf. While this number is not insignificant, it is approximately forty
properties per state per year. This amounts to a tiny fraction of properties in each state-and
this number includes "threatened" as well as actual takings. More generally, Berliner asserts
that the use of eminent domain disparages the "very strong [American] ethic that you work
hard so that some day you or your children can own a home." Diane Cardwell, Bloomberg
Says Power to Seize Private Land Is Vital to Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at B1. Our
status-preserving plan honors this American ethic.
64. Garnett, supra note 6, at 122-23 (recounting a state agency's internal audit revealing
that "relocation assistance [to homeowners] routinely exceeded the statutory limits" of the
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act); id. at 142 (explaining
that compensation above the minimum required may reflect the acquiring agency's attempt
to "limit resistance" and to "avoid costly and politically damaging battles in both courts of
law and courts of public opinion"). For example, Forest City Ratner Companies, the
developer of the multibillion dollar Atlantic Yards Project in Brooklyn, New York, paid $1.1
million for an apartment that was purchased for $419,000 one year earlier. Nicholas
Confessore, Forced to Move, Some Find Greener Grass, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at B 1.
The owners of the apartment referred to the developer as a "fair but savvy negotiator[]." Id.
Another displaced resident who described the payment he received as a "very good price"
for his property lauded the developer for devoting the time and resources to "treat us as
humans." Id.
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resentment of a forced sale on the ground that their homes are unique and
cannot be replaced merely by money. For many, this categorization will
resonate and the political outcry that followed Kelo confirms this
speculation. Yet it is fairly clear that however significant this emotional
loss, most homeowners are able to find another focus for their attachment.
The concern we would like to explore from a societal perspective is for
those-many black or Latino-for whom the compensation is inadequate to
allow the purchase of another home. Our worry that blacks and Latinos are
particularly likely to lose their status as homeowners when the government
exercises its power of eminent domain is not merely academic speculation.
We began to focus on the issue of the "justness" of compensation in light of
our experience studying two communities, the Lower Ninth Ward in New
Orleans, whose travails are well-publicized, and Waterfront South in
Camden, New Jersey.
The Lower Ninth Ward was among the neighborhoods most devastated
by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005.65 Pre-Katrina, the neighborhood was
already struggling. Comprised of 14,008 residents, 98% of whom were
black, the Lower Ninth Ward suffered a severe concentration of poverty,
high crime rates, poor educational outcomes, and decades of financial
neglect. 66 Paradoxically, despite these indicators, the Lower Ninth Ward
boasted the highest rate of homeownership in Orleans Parish, Louisiana,
with 60% of households owner-occupied. 67 The high homeownership rates
suggested prosperity at odds with the reality-most of the homes were
constructed in the 1950s and remained within families during the decades
that followed. The poverty of the owners precluded adequate investment,
and homes were often in poor physical condition prior to the storm. The
median home value was tens of thousands less than the Orleans Parish at
$52,420 versus $88,100.68 The Lower Ninth Ward was physically separate
from the rest of New Orleans, bound by a waterway, an industrial corridor,
and railroad tracks. A high percentage of homes were unoccupied and the
neighborhood was often described as blighted.
Though separated by thousands of miles and culturally very distinct, the
city of Camden, New Jersey faces similar challenges to those of the preand post-Katrina Lower Ninth Ward. As of the most recent census, 53.3%
69
of Camden residents are black, 38.9% are Latino, and 16.8% are white.
Approximately 30,000 of its 87,000 residents live below the poverty level,
65. See Dan Baum, The Lost Year: Behind the Failure to Rebuild, NEW YORKER, Aug.

21, 2006, at 46.
66. Cornell University, New Orleans Planning Initiative, Physical, Economic, and Social
Attributes of the Lower Ninth Ward, http://www.aap.comell.edu/crp/outreach
/nopi/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
67. Id.

68. Id.
69. U.S. Census Bureau, Highlights from the Census 2000 Demographic Profiles,
http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Nov. 11, 2008). Rachel Godsil has written about
Camden elsewhere. See Godsil, supra note 19, at 1823 (citing CAMConnect and the
National Neighborhood Indicators Database).
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40% of Camden households have no employed family members, and 60%
receive governmental financial assistance. 70 Most acute is the experience
of those living in Waterfront South. Like the Lower Ninth Ward,
Waterfront South is physically separate from the rest of the city as a result
of a highway. It is extremely polluted-suffering from among the highest
levels of particulate pollution in the state. 7 1 According to the EPA's
National Air Toxics assessment, Waterfront South is one of72the two worst
census tracts in the country for cancer risk from air pollution.
Waterfront South contains multiple waste facilities-and two residential
areas. One four-block area is known as the Terraces and contains
approximately forty-one families. The other, a few blocks north, is
comprised of four hundred families. Both areas at one time contained
comfortable row houses that were home to ship workers. 73 When the
shipyard closed, white ship workers and their families left for the suburbs,
and many black families purchased the homes. 74 Residents say that these
areas continued to be nice places to live until industry and traffic began to
compromise the air quality. 75 The combination of a highway linking the
bridges to Philadelphia, a sewage treatment plant, and an incinerator located
blocks away caused residents to abandon their homes. 76 Urban historian
Howard Gillette has written about the Terraces:
The city tore down parts of the Terraces, but lacking funds to complete
the job left a few remaining homes on certain blocks, looking
incongruous, for their isolation among grown-over lots littered with trash.
A few remaining shells attracted drug dealing, and periodically police
swat teams would sweep the area, passing through the high grasses with
77
guns poised in a scene reminiscent of Vietnam. Prostitution flourished.
Not surprisingly, the market value of the homes remaining in Waterfront
South is extremely low. For example, in Waterfront South, a threebedroom home is valued from $18,000 to $50,000, while a similarly sized
working class town of Pennsauken is valued from
home in the nearby white
7
$65,000 to $135,000. 8
Homeowners in both the Lower Ninth Ward and Waterfront South have
recently confronted the possibility of government-induced exit with only
70. HEALTH VISIONS, INC., CAMDEN CITY HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENT:

OF CONSUMERS

IN THE CITY OF CAMDEN,

NEW JERSEY

20

(1995),

PERSPECTIVES

available at

http://www.camconnect.org/resources/documents/healthneedsassessmentvl-8-2.pdf
71. S. JERSEY ENVTL. JUSTICE ALLIANCE, FACT SHEET-CAMDEN ENVIRONMENTAL
CONDITIONS

(2006),

available

at

http://www.njeja.org/PDF/SJEJA%20ToxicTour%

20Factsheet9-06.pdf
72. Id. at 1-2.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Howard Gillette, Camden After the Fall: Decline and Renewal in a Post-industrial
City 1-2 (manuscript, on file with authors).
78. See National Association of Realtors, http://www.realtor.com (last visited Nov. 15,
2008) (search Camden ZIP code "08102"; search Pennsauken ZIP code "08109").
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the fair market value of their homes in hand. While Louisiana is among the
states that responded to the Kelo decision with an extreme state amendment
precluding the use of eminent domain for economic development purposes,
the Road Home Plan adopted by the State of Louisiana may have exactly
that effect. 79 The Road Home Plan was intended to provide financial
assistance to compensate for Katrina-related damages to Louisiana homes
by offering affected homeowners grants to rebuild a principal residence or
the option to sell the property to the state at a prestorm fair market value.
Under the plan as originally envisioned, homeowners were not entitled to
rebuilding grants in areas "where a high proportion of homeowners are
choosing not to invest."' 80 The plan provides affected New Orleans
homeowners with a Hobson's choice: rebuild at their own expense, sell at
current (utterly marginal) fair market value to private purchasers, or sell to
the state at prestorm fair market values. The third "choice" is the functional
equivalent to the state's power of eminent domain. The City of Camden
has spent millions of dollars on redevelopment plans-some of which have
included the use of eminent domain in the beleaguered Waterfront South
area.81 While the most recent version of the redevelopment plan for
Waterfront South was struck down on land use grounds, 82 the specter of
eminent domain remains.
In both instances, the government reasonably considers certain areas to
be better suited for purposes other than their current residential uses.
However, in both, if homeowners are compensated at fair market value,
they are unlikely to be able to afford to purchase a home elsewhere-except
perhaps in another area subject to continuing environmental risks or so
blighted that it may be the next target for eminent domain takings.
Some may contend that the government should not be forced to exceed
fair market value simply because a particular home is worth so little on the
market that its fair market value is inadequate to cover the purchase of
another home. This argument is based upon the seemingly reasonable
premise that the government need only place the property owner in as good
a position pecuniarily as she was prior to the exercise of eminent domain.
79. David Simunovich has written that the way in which the Road Home has been

administered should entitle homeowners to the benefits of the URA. David Simunovich,
Comment, The Quiet of Dissolution: Post-DisasterRedevelopment and Status-Preserving
Compensation, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 331 (2008).
80. LA. RECOVERY

AUTH.,

THE ROAD HOME

HOUSING

PROGRAMS

ACTION

PLAN

AMENDMENT
FOR DISASTER
RECOVERY
FUNDS
6-7
(2006),
available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20061001152419/http://lra.louisiana.gov/assets/roadhome/Housi
ngActionPlanAmendment050306.pdf.
The rebuild restriction was never formally

implemented; however, the provision worked its inequitable harm in the months immediately
following the storm, when displaced residents made relocation decisions. Simunovich, supra

note 79, at 352-56.
81.

CITY OF CAMDEN, WATERFRONT SOUTH BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(2000), available at http://www.ci.camden.nj.us/departments/Waterfront%20South%20
Brownfield%20Redevelopment%20Project.pdf.
82. Dwight Ott, Camden Judge Rejects Waterfront South Redevelopment Plan, PHILA.
INQ., May 31, 2007, at B3.
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However, the U.S. Constitution requires that those whose property is taken
shall receive "just compensation." 83 Further, this argument presupposes
that the government had no role in determining the value of the property,
and that distributive justice concerns cannot be taken into account in
determining the "justness" of compensation.
Neither assumption is
accurate. As we discuss below, government activity tends to be integral to
determining the market value of property. In addition, might the status of
homeowner have value independent of the specific monetary value of the
specific property?
If so, for compensation to be "just" when the
government exercises its power of eminent domain, it must both recognize
its own role in setting property value and compensate to ensure that
property owner status is retained.
II. STATUS PRESERVATION

Should government be in the position of preserving homeowner status as
such? This part explores arguments both positive and normative that
resources should be devoted to ensuring that people maintain their status as
homeowners in the contexts of current assaults. Our use of the term
"status" here implies a hierarchy-that the status of homeowner is superior
to the status of renter, and therefore, the person whose status changes from
homeowner to renter is occupying a lesser position. 84 First, then, we must
contend with whether this conclusion is sound-whether in fact
homeownership per se is valuable, and then we will grapple with the
question of whether the government should subsidize those occupying the
preferred status position.
While it has become commonplace, upon reflection it is not entirely
obvious why those owning rather than renting a home are accorded a more
valued status. In both instances, a person is expending resources to have a
property interest in a dwelling. There are legal differences, of course,
between a freehold and a leasehold estate in land-and we can begin with
the legal distinctions to understand the differences we attribute to
homeownership and leaseholds. A person or family who owns a fee simple
possesses the largest possible share of the rights in the iconic property
bundle (use, possession, the right to exclude, and the right to transfer),
while a person or family who possesses a leasehold interest has occupancy
rights to the property only for a specified period of time. Other limitations
upon use or transfer may also be specified within the terms of the individual
lease. In modern times, typically, the fee owner of a rental property is also

83. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
84. Groups fight about status because they are fighting about their relative social
identities. J.M. Balkin, Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2315 n.2 (1997); see also
Bemardo A. Huberman, Christoph H. Loch & Ayse Onqiiler, Status as a Valued Resource,
67 Soc. PSYCH. Q. 103, 103 (2004) ("Humans strive not only for access to resources and
material benefits but also for intangibles such as status, which is characterized by a rankordered relationship among people associated with prestige and deference behavior."
(citation omitted)).
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subject to legally imposed obligations to the leaseholder, like ensuring that
the property is habitable. 85 These obligations are intended to benefit the
renter, but they also mean that the fee owner maintains an active role with
respect to the property and that the leaseholder does not exercise significant
responsibility over the property. The fee simple therefore entitles the owner
to a great deal more autonomy and control over the property than most
86
leaseholds.
Along with its legal dimensions, homeownership has long been imbued
with considerable cultural significance. 8 7 One aspect of homeownership's
cultural significance is its link to wealth creation. As economic geographer
Irene Hardill notes, 88 the role of homeownership in determining a family's
wealth is a staple of literature, with examples ranging from Anthony
Trollope's Barsetshire stories and George Bernard Shaw's first play, The89
Widower's House, to Andre Dubus's more recent House of Sand and Fog.
In each story, a family's future wealth is understood to depend upon
retaining ownership of a home. Because our society values wealth and
links it to status, it is not surprising that homeownership is accorded more
status than renting, which is often viewed as "throwing money down the
90
drain."
If homeownership status is merely a means of garnering some families'
wealth (a purely private good), it seems deeply troubling for government to
subsidize that status. This apparent contradiction can be explained by other
aspects of homeownership. Homeownership and its attendant autonomy
and control over property are understood to generate other goods such as
better living conditions, involvement in the community, and the ability to
ensure greater education and freedom from crime for children. 9 1 These
outcomes, if they result from homeownership, benefit both the individual or
household and the community in general, and are much more persuasive in
justifying both the greater status accorded to homeowners and government
support of that status.
A range of empirical studies have concluded that homeownership does in
fact have salutary benefits for households and communities-even
ownership in low-income census tracts. 92 In a recent regression analysis of
85. 2 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 16B.04[2] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000).

86. In a recent popular exploration of the link between status and health, epidemiologist
Michael Marmot posits that status is linked with increased longevity and general well-being

because those with higher status have more autonomy and control over their lives as well as
better opportunities for full social engagement. MICHAEL MARMOT, THE STATUS SYNDROME:
How SOCIAL STANDING AFFECTS OUR HEALTH AND LONGEVITY 2 (2004).
87. See generally IRENE HARDILL, GENDER, MIGRATION AND THE DUAL CAREER
HOUSEHOLD (2002).
88. Id. at 48.
89. See id.

90. Id.
91. See HUD USER, URBAN POLICY BRIEF No. 2 (1995), http://www.huduser.org/
publications/txt/hdbrf2.txt.
92. See, e.g., ROBERT D. DIETZ, HOMEOWNERSHIP ALLIANCE, THE SOCIAL
http://www.new
available at
(2003),
HOMEOWNERSHIP
OF
CONSEQUENCES
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the effect of homeownership upon children, Joseph Harkness and Sandra
Newman found both that homeownership is beneficial to children
regardless of the neighborhood, and that children of renters do not gain
nearly the benefit from more affluent neighborhoods as do children of
homeowners. 9 3 The benefits accruing to children are wide-ranging:
children of homeowners acquire more education and are less likely to be on
welfare; while the findings were less robust, children of homeowners are
also less likely to be economically idle and to have children out of
wedlock. 94 Hamkness and Newman are careful to note that these findings
represent only an initial step and that more research with larger sample sizes
is needed. Surveying a wealth of empirical data, economist Robert Dietz
similarly reports that homeownership improves "household stability, social
involvement, local political participation and activism, environmental
awareness,
child
outcomes,
health,
crime,
and
community
characteristics." 95 Homeownership is also associated with better physical
and mental health and lower divorce rates for married couples. 96 While
Dietz notes that the studies linking homeownership and health suffer from
weak methodology and encourages more robust studies to confirm these
findings, the findings are consistent with a significant literature linking
physical and emotional well-being with increased status. In other words,
the status we attribute to homeownership has the effect of increasing the
well-being of those to whom we confer the status lift.
Another notable finding is that many of the positive outcomes associated
with homeownership appear to be linked to the transaction costs associated
with both acquiring and vacating a fee simple. 97 Traditionally, in order to
purchase a home, most people must both save for a down payment and have
adequate credit to obtain a mortgage. These hurdles determine financial
behavior. More importantly, once the fee simple has been acquired, the
household tends to be less mobile because the transaction costs associated
with moving have been increased considerably. This reduced mobility,

towncdc.org/pdf/social-consequences-study.pdf (reviewing studies); id. at 9 (citing Scott
Southdale & Kyle Crowder, Escaping Distressed Neighborhoods:
Individuality,

Community, and Metropolitan Influences, 102 AM. J. Soc. 1040 (1997), for the conclusion
that homeowners are less likely to relocate from distressed neighborhoods); Joseph M.
Harkness & Sandra J. Newman, Effects of Homeownership on Children: The Role of
Neighborhood Characteristicsand Family Income, ECON. POL'Y REv., June 2003, at 87

(reviewing studies).
93. Harkness & Newman, supra note 92, at 99.

94. Id. at 93-94. Specifically, Joseph Harkness and Sandra Newman found that children
of homeowners are estimated to complete a half year more of education, to have a 13%
higher graduation rate, a 6% likelihood of completing some post-secondary education, and a
9% less likelihood of being economically idle. Id. They found these results to be highly
statistically significant even if controls for neighborhood features are added in. The
estimates for out-of-wedlock childbearing are favorable but weak. Id. at 94.
95. DIETZ, supra note 92, at 1.

96. Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).
97. See id. at 12-13 (citations omitted).
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which might otherwise seem to be a negative, translates into both
98
commitment to place and stability for family.
Once a homeowner has developed a financial stake in a particular
dwelling, there is a close link between that financial stake and the wellbeing of the community in which the dwelling is located. 99 As we noted, a
homeowner's wealth is often largely determined by the value of her home,
and therefore, homeowners (unlike renters) have an incentive to maintain
their dwellings. Better maintained homes are less likely to be health
hazards (for example, lead paint is more likely to be remediated) and they
contribute to the aesthetic of a neighborhood. The homeowner's stake in
the neighborhood lends itself to community engagement and activismwhich both improves neighborhood parks, schools, and the like, and also
leads to better emotional health for those so engaged. 10 0
Though the positive outcomes associated with homeownership are
considerable, there are some downsides. The reduced mobility noted above
can have a negative effect on the efficiency of labor markets since
homeowners may be less willing or able to move to obtain employment.' 0 '
In recessionary times, when the housing market declines and the labor
market tightens, a family may be whipsawed between the difficulty in
selling their home and the location of a job. In addition to the potential
downsides of homeownership for families, homeowners are understood to
engage in parochial behavior in pursuit of their own interests that harm the
public at large. Examples include pressing for restrictive zoning laws
against building low- and moderate-income housing and engaging in other
10 2
sorts of Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) behavior.
Also of concern is the fact that in general, blacks, Latinos, and lowincome families benefit less from homeownership than affluent white
households. 10 3 In a recent paper, Dorothy Brown persuasively argues that
black, Latino, and low-income families are often less able to generate
wealth from their homes than whites. 104 This difference is a result of
multiple factors. First, these households are more likely to hold subprime
mortgages with higher interest rates-rendering the cost of the same unit of
housing more expensive. Second, homes owned by blacks, Latinos, and
low-income families appreciate less than homes owned by affluent

98. Id.
99. Id. at 4; see LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY BEYOND THE
PARCEL (forthcoming) (on file with authors) (delinking home value from neighborhood

characteristics).
100. DIETZ, supra note 92, at 6-9 (citing list of studies).
101. Id. at 13 (citing Andrew Oswald, Theory of Homes and Jobs (Sept. 18, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review)).
102. In earlier work, Godsil explores the role of affluent white Not in My Backyard
(NIMBY) behavior in leading to the disproportionate burden of environmentally adverse
land uses upon communities of color. See, e.g., Godsil, supra note 19; Rachel Godsil, Note,
Remedying EnvironmentalRacism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394 (1991).
103. See generally Brown, supra note 18, at 24.
104. Id.
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whites. 10 5 The combination of higher interest loans and slower or
nonexistent appreciation can drastically reduce the accumulation of equity.
Relatedly, the Harkness and Newman study found that children of
homeowners are slightly more likely to be adversely affected by
10 6
neighborhood poverty than are children of renters.
Even with these caveats, however, it seems clear that homeowner status
overall generates net positive outcomes for both families and communities.
While black, Latino, and low-income homeowning families do not do as
well relative to affluent white homeowning families, they are still
significantly better off than they would be if they were renters.' 07 As
Newman and Harkness conclude, "[i]t is noteworthy that even with...
extremely poor neighborhood characteristics, and under the assumption that
owner children are, in fact, more adversely affected by these conditions
than renter children, effects of homeownership on children's outcomes tend
108
to be positive."'
One question, obviously, is whether there are legal precedents for
protecting status qua status. The closest analogy, in our view, is found in
the common law of defamation. Defamation law protects against attacks on
"reputation"-which while not precisely defined is often understood as akin
to status. 10 9 A central debate within defamation law has been whether
reputation should be protected only to the extent that it can be measured in
the marketplace-which allows for an interesting parallel with our
homeowner conundrum.
One school posits that a good reputation (or framed slightly differently,
the reputation of possessing a good character) is merely a form of property.
Such a reputation is acquired as a result of a person's efforts (echoes of
Locke's labor theory) and translates into a form of capital in the form of
access to credit or likelihood of benefiting from "'patronage and support"'
from others."I 0 The concept of reputation as a marketable asset leads to a
conclusion that defamation law should protect that which can be valued by
the market and sets the limits of damages to that measure.
The property view of defamation law is not entirely supported by either
case law or academic commentators. I 1 Several doctrinal elements of
defamation law do not cohere with the property conception-most notably
105. Brown cites research showing that homes owned by blacks and Latinos appreciate
less partially because of continued racism in the housing market: "Homes lose about sixteen
percent of their value when more than 10% of the neighborhood is black." Id. at 23.
106. Harkness & Newman, supra note 92, at 96.
107. See Brown, supra note 18, at 27.
108. Harkness & Newman, supra note 92, at 98.
109. For a thoughtful discussion of defamation law, see Robert C. Post, The Social
Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691
(1986).
110. Id. at 694 (quoting JOEL HAWES, LECTURES ADDRESSED TO THE YOUNG MEN OF
HARTFORD AND NEW HAVEN, AND PUBLISHED AT THEIR UNITED REQUEST 112 (Hartford,

Oliver D. Cooks & Co. 1828)).
111. Id. at 697-99.
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the doctrine of slander per se or libel under which a trier of fact is
empowered to award damages without any proof of actual harm to
reputation. 112 If reputation is a form of property, and a particular aspersion
upon a person's reputation cannot be shown to actually affect the person's
ability to capitalize upon their reputation, then it would seem that the
reputation was not damaged and that any damages award was merely a
windfall. And yet, longstanding defamation law creates an irrebuttable
presumption of damages in successful actions for slander or libel per se.
According to Robert Post, the disjuncture between the doctrine and the
property conception at defamation law can be explained by an alternative
conception of reputation as honor." 3 This form of reputation maps onto the
sociological definition of status. As explained by anthropologist John
Davis, honor can be understood as "a system of stratification: it describes
the distribution of wealth in a social idiom, and prescribes appropriate
behaviour for people at the various points in the hierarchy; it entails
acceptance of superordination and subordination.""11 4 One's honor is
attached to one's status or social position. Aspersions upon honor or status
challenge a person's place in her community and fundamental social
identity.
This understanding of reputation as honor or status changes the role of
defamation law considerably.
It becomes a way to vindicate the
status/honor that has been impugned, and in so doing, to reify the value of
the particular status position. This understanding then coheres with the
doctrine of slander or libel per se: it does not matter that the libeled party
cannot prove specific pecuniary loss because the harm is to the person's
status or honor, and therefore, a large damages award is a communication
that the person's status in the community is worth vindicating.
Under this view of reputation, at issue is not only the individual person's
loss, but the harm to the social role she inhabits. Therefore, when
defamation law is vindicating a particular person, it is also vindicating the
public's interest in the protection of the social role. 115 While this view may
seem somewhat anachronistic-Post suggests that reputation as honor
predominated in deference societies like preindustrial England l16
defamation law continues to utilize conceptions of damages consistent with
the role. More significantly for our purposes, our own society continues to

112. 1 SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 2.8.1 (3d ed.
2008).
113. Post, supra note 109, at 699.
114. JoHN DAVIS, PEOPLE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN: AN ESSAY IN COMPARATIVE SOCIAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 98 (1977).
115. See Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 743, 745 (1986) (discussing reputation as "a public good, not merely a private
possession").
116. See Post, supra note 109, at 699.

2008]

PROTECTING STATUS

imbue some roles or statuses with particular significance, 117 including, we
submit, the role of homeowner.
III. TAKING STATUS
Homeowner status, we have argued, is itself valuable. It leads to positive
outcomes across a wide range of variables for every age, race, and
economic category. The issue, then, is whether threats to this status should
trigger government protection. The argument is easiest when the challenge
to homeowner status is external-such as the government using its power of
eminent domain to require sale. In this context, the person's homeowner
status is only at risk because the government has reached the conclusion
that the public good is served by using the property for some other use. In
addition, the government is constrained by the Fifth Amendment's just
compensation clause. Here, then, the issue is whether compensation that
exceeds fair market value is ever justifiable.
A. JurisprudenceofJust Compensation
It is useful to begin this inquiry with an understanding of the origins of
the government's power of eminent domain. 118 Prior to the American
Revolution, the colonies appear to have taken for granted the power of
government to compel certain uses of land and sometimes to condemn land
for government-chosen uses. 119
The Framers of the Constitution
recognized the necessity of retaining this power, but tempered it with the
requirement that private property shall not be taken for public use without
"just compensation."
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged the inherent difficulty in
adhering to this constitutional mandate. In Kimball Laundry v. United
States, the Court explained that "only that 'value' need be considered which
is attached to 'property"'; the Court then acknowledged that because of
subjective attachments to a home, "its value to the owner may therefore
differ widely from its value to the taker." 120 To avoid the definitional
21
conundrum, the Court adopted a fair market standard of compensation.
While acknowledging that the property owner would suffer real and
uncompensated loss, the Court reasoned that, like the losses due to the
exercise of the police power, such was the burden of citizenship.

117. Post suggests an honor code continues to prevail in the military and that roles such

as medical doctors continue to have reputational advantages solely as a result of their status.
Id. at 707.
118. The term "eminent domain" was not coined by the Romans; however, evidence
suggests that compulsory takings did exist in some form at this early point in history.
Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original Understanding of the So-Called
"Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1249 n.10 (2002) (citations omitted).
119. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1252, 1282-83 (1996).

120. Kimball Laundry v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
121. Id.
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In other cases, the Court has suggested that its case law demands that just
compensation makes the owner "'whole,"' 122 and restores the owner to "the
same position monetarily" that the owner would have occupied but for the
taking. 12 3 The Court held in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States
that "compensation must be a full and perfect equivalent for the property
taken."' 24 The Monongahela position was reaffirmed in SeaboardAir Line
Railway Co. v. United States and United States v. Miller, when the Court
held that eminent domain compensation should put an owner "in as good a
position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property not been
taken."' 125 However, the Court has never deviated from its conclusion that
the fair market value of the
compensation is just so long as it reflects
126
property on the date the property is taken.
Fair market value is considered to be "'what a willing buyer would pay in
cash to a willing seller at the time of the taking." '" 27 Courts have
repeatedly held that while the legislature, or any other government actor,
may offer a specific amount of money to a property owner, the
determination of whether the compensation is "just" remains a judicial
question. 128 Fair market value, therefore, must be measured against the just
compensation requirement, and a court may properly adjust an award up or
down, so as to ensure that "compensation is1 29'just' both to [a property
owner] and to the public that must pay the bill."
Commentators have long challenged the claim that the fair market value
standard sufficiently compensates the owner so as to satisfy the just
compensation requirement, and the question was acknowledged but
sidestepped in Kelo. The Kelo Court stated in a footnote that the fairness of
the measure of just compensation "while important, . . . [is] not before us in
122. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516 (1979) (quoting Olsen v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).
123. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).
124. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
125. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943) (citing Monongahela, 148 U.S. at
326); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923) (citing
Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 327).
Assessing
126. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
compensation awarded on the date the property is actually taken creates a problem known as
condemnation blight, discussed below, where the condemner artificially lowers its
acquisition costs through announcement of plans to condemn a predetermined area. Bell,
supra note 6, at 67. Christopher Serkin details a variety of possible mechanisms for valuing
property according to the fair market value standard. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning
of Value: Assessing Just Compensationfor Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 677,
687-703 (2005). Serkin uncovers the theoretical subtexts that may be hidden beneath
compensation debates. However, as we state above, we are not hostile to government use of
eminent domain. We only seek to ensure that the price paid by the individual affected is not
to relegate them to a propertyless status. Our goal is consistent with the argument made by
property scholars that takings jurisprudence may reasonably be used as a means to further
distributive justice. See, e.g., id. at 721.
127. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511 (quoting Miller, 317 U.S. at 374).
128. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 417 n.30 (1980) (citing
Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 327).
129. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
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this litigation."' 130 The challenge, then, is to determine to what extent, if
any, a property owner should be compensated beyond the monetary value
of the condemned property.
B. EvaluatingProposedAlternatives to FairMarket Value
Scholars have sought to advance a familiar range of values in proposing
alternative compensation schemes, including compensatory justice,
efficiency maximization, and distributive justice. 13 1 Those most concerned
with compensatory justice contend that, to the degree fair market value fails
to reflect the total loss to the property owner, the owner has not been fully
compensated for her loss. As Judge Richard Posner stated, "[t]he taking in
(call it 'personal') value that [homeowners]
effect confiscates the additional
132
obtain from the property."'
The challenge for proponents of compensatory justice schemes is to
explain why idiosyncratic value should be compensated-particularly since
government regulation, such as zoning, limits land value regularly with no
compensation at all. Efficiency maximization, perhaps ironically, helps
shore up the theoretical weaknesses of the compensatory justice argument.
If the government compensation schemes fail to internalize all the costs of a
given project, the government may go forward with externality-ridden
inefficient projects. Despite the perceived conservative bent of protection
of property rights, 133 a number of prominent property scholars propose
distributive justice as a fair goal for compensation schemes.
Our concern, status preservation, reflects all three considerations. As
recognized by the compensatory justice proponents, failing to compensate
homeowners for the lost value of homeowner status is an enormous
In
shortfall, and is avoided through status-preserving compensation.
addition, in light of the benefits of homeowner status to the homeowner and
society, the failure to internalize the costs of lost homeowner status will
cause avoidable inefficiencies, and again, is circumvented in our approach.
Lastly, our approach reflects the concern that the most vulnerable class of
homeowners will be most at risk from the potential loss of homeowner
130. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 n.21 (2005).

131. For a more detailed analysis of competing compensation plans as compared to a
status-preservation scheme, see Rachel D. Godsil & David Simunovich, Just Compensation
in an Ownership Society, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT

DOMAIN 133 (Robin Paul Malley ed., 2008).
132. Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988).

133. An Internet search confirms the notion that property rights are a more salient
concern for "conservative groups." Conservative legal groups and think tanks (i.e., the
Federalist Society, Pacific Legal Foundation, Center for Individual Rights) invariably list
"property rights" as among their primary areas of concern while liberal and progressive
groups (i.e., American Constitution Society, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, ACLU) fail to

mention property or property rights at all. Among academics, a robust scholarship exists
challenging the Right's hegemony over property rights. Notable works include

JEREMY

WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1990), and the thoughtful review of

Waldron's book, Jeremy Paul, Can Rights Move Left?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1622 (1990) (book

review).

FORDHAMLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 77

status. Consequently, as explained below, status-preserving compensation
is best suited to provide critical protection of homeowner status in any
takings context.
1. Percentage Premium Plans
One of the most frequently suggested alternatives to traditional fair
market valuation compensation is a variant of a percentage multiplier,
aimed at providing homeowners with compensation above and beyond fair
market value. Some scholars propose flat percentage bonuses. 134 These
percentage premium plans (PPPs) are supposed to act "as a balm for the
infringement upon autonomy brought about by any forced exchange and...
to correct the systematic underestimation of value" that occurs in fair
market value compensation. 135 PPPs traditionally call for, say, 10%
premiums to be added to all home valuations. 136 Alternatively, some
theorists attempt to introduce some semblance of individuation into PPPs
by adjusting premiums based on length of residency, 137 relative wealth of
the condemnee, 138 or relative value of the community in which the
139
condemnee resides.
However, analyzing these plans from a status-preserving perspective
demonstrates fundamental theoretical and practical weakness in PPP
approaches. PPPs offer no assurances that a homeowner will be able to
preserve his or her status as such. Prior to the institution of the PPP,
wealthy homeowner A was in a better position to purchase a new home than
poor homeowner B-in other words, the application of the PPP exacerbates
the wealth disparity at taxpayer expense. Additionally, there is a high
degree of inefficiency and arbitrariness inherent in such proposals. PPPs
are just as likely to overcompensate a homeowner as they are to
undercompensate. 140
The argument that no amount of monetary
compensation can ultimately be "just" does little to add to the eminent
domain debate.

134. See, e.g., RICHARD D. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 184 (1985); Barros, supra note 8, at 300; Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives
to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
681, 736-37 (1973). Although Robert C. Ellickson was offering his compensatory plan to
resolve issues of regulatory takings, the plan is equally applicable to instances of eminent
domain takings.
135. EPSTEIN, supra note 134, at 184.

136. Id.
137. Barros, supra note 8, at 300; Ellickson, supra note 134, at 736-37; John Fee,
Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 814-15 (2006).
138. Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 753-56

(1999).
139. Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and
Individuals in Law andEconomics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 141 (2004).
140. Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957,
993-94.
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Troubling for similar reasons are plans that would adjust compensation
based on community valuation. While we are sympathetic to the aims of
community premiums-advocated most notably by Gideon Parchomovsky
and Peter Siegelman 14 1-as a means to recognize the unrecognized value a
strong community brings homeowners and to create disincentives to destroy
such communities, we are concerned that, as designed, community
premiums will also exacerbate existing disparities.
Our predominant concern with such a premium plan is that its valuation
of community may result in excluding more vulnerable communities from
receiving the benefit. The community premium takes into account
1 42
"turnover rates" and "amenities" to craft an appropriate multiplier.
However, it is precisely the communities without many traditionally
14 3
recognized amenities and with high turnover rates that often have been,
and will continue to be, targeted for economic development and blight
removal takings. The community premium, while laudable in some
respects, fails to recognize the unique harms experienced by target
communities composed of politically disempowered groups. Another
concern is that in such a mass relocation, the government would be forced
to pay artificially inflated premiums, creating both a windfall to the
property owner who sells the land used for the relocation, as well as a
grossly inflated condemnation bill to the general public.
In a slightly different context-a proposed noxious land use-Rachel
Godsil has proposed an alternative premium that would specifically address
the harms to politically disempowered groups. Godsil has argued that if a
landowner seeks to impose a polluting use upon an underprotected, racially
segregated community, homeowners subject to the nuisance should have
the power to reject the use (impose a property rule) or alternatively, receive
the fair market value of their home augmented by a "segregation multiplier"
(a predetermined liability rule). 144 The strength of this proposal is its
express protection of homeowner status and its redistributive effect.
However, the proposal was designed to respond to communities suffering a
gross overburden of noxious land uses such that the community could
establish that government had failed to provide the sort of regulatory
protections applied to similarly situated white communities. In light of
current Supreme Court jurisprudence, such dramatic racially identifiable
disparities are likely to be the only facts supporting an explicitly race-based
remedy. 145 This remedy will thus rarely be available and would not apply
141. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 139, at 139-40.
142. Id. at 141-42.

143. See Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Petitioners at 7-8, Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108).

Parchmovsky and Siegelman

acknowledge that communities lacking amenities that are characterized by high turnover
rates would not necessarily merit a community premium. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra
note 139, at 141-42.
144. Godsil, supra note 19, at 1875.

145. Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potentialof Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REv. 937 (2008).
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to those poor white homeowners who would also likely lose their status as
such.
2. Harnessing the Market: Tax and Insurance Schemes
Some scholars advocate the introduction of market forces into
compensation schemes through insurance or tax-based models, 14 6 or
elements of direct democracy referenda and community-driven bargaining
processes. 14 7 This section evaluates these proposals in turn.
We are deeply concerned that insurance-based schemes will exacerbate
distributive justice concerns. Scholars contend that the introduction of a
private sector actor into the just compensation element of eminent domain
proceedings would reduce administrative and transactional costs 14 8 and
mitigate the risk of moral hazard by enabling insurance companies to adjust
premiums based on the condemnation risk. 149
Some insurance-based schemes call for homeowner self-valuation. 150
Under Lee Anne Fennell's proposal, homeowners would report the value of
their home to the government on tax returns and would be compensated at
that amount if their property were taken in an eminent domain
proceeding.' 5' In this way, homeowners value their homes prior to a taking
and incorporate their own subjective valuation. 152 To control rampant
overvaluation, homeowners would receive tax refunds based on the reported
property value-the lower the reported value, the greater the refund that a
homeowner would receive. 153 Bell and Parchomovsky propose a similar
scheme that allows homeowners to value their own property to reflect their
subjective valuation and would only be triggered if the property were
designated for condemnation.
Despite their commendable intentions, the insurance and tax models
eviscerate the very protections that the just compensation guarantee was
meant to extend to stigmatized groups. The notion that insurance-based
schemes will result in the "right" takings improperly assumes that insurance
companies have absolutely no political influence. In fact, it is more likely
that economically depressed neighborhoods will be disproportionately
targeted because takings in these areas will result in lower payouts by
146. See generally Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should "Just
Compensation " Be Abolished, and Would "Takings Insurance" Work Instead?, 64 OHIO. ST.
L.J. 451, 500-04 (2003); Fennell, supra note 140, at 995-1002.

147. See generally Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1465, 1491 (2008); James J. Kelly, "We Shall Not Be Moved": Urban Communities,
Eminent Domain and the Socioeconomics of Just Compensation, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 923,

980-81(2006).
148. Calandrillo, supra note 146, at 495-99.
149. Bell, supra note 6, at 32-33; Calandrillo, supra note 146, at 495-99, 505, 513.
150. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private,59 STAN. L.
REV. 871 (2007); Fennell, supra note 140, at 995-96.
151. Fennell, supra note 140, at 995-96.
152. Id. at 995.

153. Id. at 996.
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insurance carriers to homeowners as compared to higher priced
neighborhoods.
Most disturbing is the reality that insurance companies adjust premiums
based on the likelihood that the insured will eventually require a payout.
Residents living in neighborhoods that are prime candidates for economic
redevelopment or blight removal would pay higher premiums because they
present a higher risk of payout to the insurance company. Thus, the very
residents who are least able to afford additional financial burdens would be
most at risk of paying unfairly high premiums. Furthermore, it is highly
likely that homeowners will attempt to save money in the short term by not
carrying insurance. While this choice could be chalked up to individual
discretion, the regressive pressure of such plans should be acknowledged.
Not only would residents in economically depressed areas pay higher
premiums, there is also a substantial risk that some homeowners (likely
those who can least afford it) would carry no insurance, leaving them
completely vulnerable to a taking without any compensation.
Tax-based schemes are equally problematic. They create the obvious
incentive for poor homeowners to undervalue their homes for the purposes
of some potential taking, at some unknown time in the future, in exchange
for greater tax returns that are definite, immediate, and sorely needed.
While Fennell's proposal limits the self-valuation to 100% to 200% of the
154
assessed value and therefore protects against a dramatic undervaluation,
assessed values are often much lower than actual fair market value, and her
proposal offers little value to low-income families who are unlikely to
overvalue their homes for the reasons described. And though Bell and
Parchomovsky's proposal is triggered at a specific point in time, they fail to
acknowledge the difficulty that a poor family will have in achieving any
greater protection for its property under a self-valuation scheme.1 55 To the
extent that their scheme is intended to provide more protection for deeply
undervalued homes or, in the case of the poor family, from being unable to
afford to purchase a replacement home, assessing a higher than market
value has serious risks that a poor family is unable to afford. The first, of
course, is if the government demurs and chooses against the condemnation
once the costs are greater than anticipated, the poor family is unlikely to be
able to afford the greater taxes. In addition, they will have great difficulty
selling on an open market, and therefore, will be unable to exercise exit in
the future. Finally, such restraints on alienation will render such homes
impossible to mortgage should that be necessary for equity in the future.
We are more sympathetic to the aims of proposed public referenda plans
or proposals to grant displaced homeowners with alienable rights of return
in the post-taking community, which seek to vest greater control in the
individuals who will be most directly affected by the eminent domain
process. Majority approval, or even approval by supermajorities, would
154. Fennell, supra note 140, at 997.

155. Bell & Parchmovsky, supra note 150, at 903.
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obviously ensure that certain takings receive at least some degree of express
56
public approval. 1
These alternatives seek to incorporate distributive justice concerns into
hypothetical compensatory schemes, and present perhaps the most desirable
alternatives to an expressly status-preserving compensation plan.
Nevertheless, they fail to provide comprehensive protection to all property
owners confronting the threat of eminent domain proceedings. Most
significantly, the various schemes only apply when the use of eminent
domain is intended to promote economic development rather than the full
range of government land uses. Therefore, those property owners who lose
their land to a highway, for example, remain unprotected.
A right of return that can be sold to others has significant merit.
However, we have several concerns. First, granting the right of return will
likely lead to avoidable inefficiencies. Second, the right of return as applied
may be both prohibitively expensive and procedurally cumbersome. Those
significant concerns aside, the right of return concept does address many
distributive justice concerns. It grants owners of the property the right
either to benefit directly from the redevelopment of their neighborhood and
its increased amenities and job opportunities, while also granting them the
choice to recoup the profits and use the proceeds to relocate.
3. Variable Compensation Plans
A final category of compensation plans are those premised on the notion
that compensation need not, and indeed should not, be uniform for different
uses of eminent domain. Under this approach, property owners whose
property is condemned for a classical public use such as a road or a post
office should receive fair market value, while, as articulated by James Krier
and Christopher Serkin, "just compensation is adjusted upward in specific
ways as the use of condemned property moves from classic public use to
157
possible public ruse to naked transfer."'
This version of a spectrum compensation proposal appears likely to meet
our status-preserving standard for those homeowners whose property was
condemned for purposes other than classic public uses. If undertaken in
good faith, the government's projection of the value of a property taken for
a revitalization project would seem likely to be adequate to allow for
reasonable replacement housing; if not, it would seem to be a rather illconceived project. The risk, perhaps, is undervaluation of properties
intentionally designed to lower compensation costs. This risk seems likely
to be mediated by both public oversight and the need to attract investors.
The weakness of the proposal, as we have articulated above, is its
suggestion that fair market value is adequate when property is taken for
traditional public uses.
156. Kelly, supra note 147, at 928-29.
157. James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 859,
867.
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Serkin has also proposed a more dramatic version of variable
compensation as one component of a scheme under which local
governments are entitled to choose among the full menu of property rights'
protective devices, varying from the least to the most protective. 15 8 Serkin
offers a compensation model that includes fair market value as least
protective, market value with specified damages or a percentage premium
59
as a middle ground, and a gain-based measure as the most protective.'
For the reasons we have already described, under both the least protective
and the middle range of regimes, affected property owners may well lose
their status as homeowners. In addition, the middle range of protection
provides a regressive bonus to more valuable properties. The goals Serkin
furthers in his significantly broader article are likely to be equally advanced
by raising the floor of compensation for poor property owners.
C. Status-PreservingCompensation
Traditional fair market value compensation fails to ensure the
homeowner is "made whole" after a taking. To date, most alternative
compensation plans are likely to leave some homeowners unable to
preserve their status as homeowners. The most effective, efficient, and just
alternative is a compensatory scheme that preserves the homeowner's status
as such. Additionally, this status-preserving scheme also permits fiscally
constrained governments to invoke the eminent domain power to expand1
16
the market of affordable housing, 160 encourage economic development,
and foster a tax base to support the provision of critical infrastructure and
62
support services.1
The compensation scheme best designed to protect the most vulnerable
homeowners-the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs (URA)was adopted by the federal government in the aftermath of the urban
renewal debacle. 163 The URA mandates that homeowners be compensated
for moving expenses, mortgage costs that arise from early payment, closing
costs, as well as a replacement payment to help ensure homeowners are
provided with comparable post-taking housing. 164 The URA defines
comparable housing as (1) decent, safe, and sanitary; (2) adequate in size to
accommodate the occupants; (3) functionally equivalent to the acquired
property; and (4) located in an area not subject to unreasonable adverse
158. See Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property
Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 883 (2007).
159. See id. at 910-11.
160. See Brief for Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No.
04-108) (describing plans for redevelopment of the Atlantic Yards in Brooklyn, New York to
expand the supply of affordable housing).

161. Id. at 3-4.
162. See id. at 8.

163. 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(1)-(3) (2000).
164. Id. §§ 4622-4624.
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environmental conditions. 165 We do not suggest that the other models of
compensation proposed by academics are valueless. The vast majority are
seeking to further ends different than those we seek to protect. Instead, we
argue here that the URA's replacement model should serve as a sort of
Rawlsian floor. For compensation to be just, it must at minimum ensure
that it is adequate to preserve homeowner status.
Losing a home because of eminent domain undoubtedly carries with it
lasting trauma for an unwilling seller. However, the URA's flexible
definition serves to preserve homeowner status, and can move displaced
residents living in substandard housing into improved living conditions.
While this provision certainly does not eliminate the psychic and emotive
harms caused by takings, it reinforces the condemner's obligation to
displaced residents, and ensures, if nothing else, that an evicted homeowner
can at least maintain her homeowner status.
Furthermore, if the
condemning authority cannot secure comparable replacement housing
within the statutory relocation assistance amount, the URA expressly
permits the condemning authority to provide compensation beyond the
statutory limits. 166
The URA status-preserving scheme eliminates inefficiencies created by
the percentage premium plans discussed above. The URA plan extends the
greatest protection to displaced homeowners and the broadest leverage to
takers to adjust compensation to actual market conditions, thereby ensuring
that redevelopment plans are not only uniquely tailored to the community at
issue, but also maximally efficient. This responsiveness is absent in flat
percentage premium plans, community premiums, complete relocation
plans, and premiums adjusted according to condemnees' length of residence
in a community or socioeconomic status.
Status-preserving compensation is also highly responsive to distributive
167
justice concerns. It eliminates the problem of condemnation blight
because compensation is not based on the value of the acquired home, but
on its replacement value. Furthermore, while it reinforces homeownership
as a core American ethic, it does not create perverse pressures that arise in
insurance- and tax-based compensation schemes, and extends the same
level of protection to homeowners that condone the proceedings as to those
who holdout.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), however, has
concluded that the implementation of the URA has not matched its promise.
While the GAO's primary findings concerned the inadequacy of business

165. 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(a)(6) (2007).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 4626(a); see also Gamett, supra note 6, at 122-23.

167. Condemnation blight describes the reduction in value of a property that occurs after
it is announced that the property will be condemned. Bell, supra note 6, at 67.
Condemnation blight artificially lowers acquisition costs because fair market value is
measured by 'what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller' at the time of the
taking." United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (quoting United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)).
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relocation costs, there was a general sense among officials that the URA's
statutory caps were too low to compensate fully for relocation costs. More
study is required to determine exactly how the URA has functioned in
practice-and why its promise has not been realized.
IV. PRESERVING STATUS IN THE FACE OF DEFAULT
The mortgage crisis has not generally been viewed as likely to lead to a
rash of homelessness-rather, it has raised the specter of people losing
homes they purchased. In other words, most who are concerned about the
mortgage foreclosure debacle recognize that homeowner status is at issue.
This part evaluates the many proposals offered at various stages of the
mortgage crisis to assist at-risk homeowners and considers whether the
same arguments supporting increased compensation in the eminent domain
context translate into general principles against which proposed responses
to the mortgage crisis can be judged. As discussed below, the mortgage
crisis raises very different issues than the eminent domain context because
some of the proposals at issue will raise barriers to entry for those aspiring
to homeowner status. Here, then, we see a need to balance one set of
interests-protecting current homeowners-with another.
Government officials at federal, state, and municipal levels have
proposed plans based upon the central assumption that "special safeguards
should be thrown around home ownership as a guarantee of social and
economic stability." 168
Thus, notwithstanding the reality that willing
participants1 69 arrived at binding contractual agreements as to the rights and
obligations of each to the other, federal and state governments are taking
steps (albeit not proactively) to alter those agreed-upon obligations.
Government efforts range from facilitating voluntary, industry-led
programs to multibillion dollar community block grants, and court-imposed
rewriting of the terms of the mortgage agreements. As this Article goes to
press in the late fall of 2008, the mortgage crisis has spiraled into a global
financial crisis. 170 The Bush administration brokered a $700 billion bailout
of our leading financial institutions under the auspices of the U.S.
Department of Treasury. 7 1 While the timing of this publication precludes a
comprehensive analysis of the bailout, we consider the varied responses to
the mortgage crisis in the months leading up to the bailout and offer
preliminary reactions with our dual concerns of status preservation and
protection of aspiring homeowners in mind.

168. L. Randall Wray, Lessonsfrom the Subprime Meltdown 44 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard
Coll., Working Paper No. 522, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin
?abstract id= 1070833 (quoting President Franklin Roosevelt).

169. Ignoring for the moment arguments of imperfect information and claims of
predatory lending.
170. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Offers Wall St. Banks New Loans to Ease Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, at Al.

171. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765.
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A. FederalProposals
As the extent of the mortgage crisis becomes apparent, federal lawmakers
have proposed a wide array of responses. In contrast to the eminent domain
context, in which the federal government has long followed the practice of
providing fair market value or replacement value under the URA to
condemnees, the federal response to the mortgage crisis is much more
Competing factions within the federal executive and
contentious.
have offered a veritable panoply of responses. These
branches
legislative
proposals are animated by competing conceptions of who should bear the
cost of widespread mortgage defaults, the proper degree of direct
government intervention72in the free market, and principles of equity and
personal responsibility. 1
1. Voluntary or Market-Based Responses
Initially, the Bush administration emphasized voluntary industrysponsored proposals to respond to the lending crisis. One of President
George W. Bush's first efforts-the Hope Now program-brought the
nation's largest lenders and investors together to "yield[] a promising new
source of relief for American homeowners." 173 Hope Now was designed to
assist subprime borrowers who are current on their mortgage payments but
1 74
cannot afford the payments once a higher, adjusted interest rate kicks in.
Hope Now, estimated initially to provide assistance for more than one
million homeowners, was intended to provide eligible homeowners with the
opportunity to refinance into a lower cost FHA loan, as well as the chance
to freeze interest rates for five years.1 75 However, narrow eligibility and
limited workout capabilities have blunted the impact of this program. After
172. The discussion below focuses on efforts to address the current mortgage crisis, not

those that seek to prevent the recurrence of a similar situation. A number of preventative
measures have been put forward, and they are generally directed at recalibrating the balance
of information between borrower and lender and increasing governmental regulation of the
mortgage lending industry. The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007

would establish a national licensing system for mortgage lenders and a duty of care standard
for home loan originators, require the lender to make a finding of the borrower's "reasonable
ability to repay" a home loan, and proscribe refinancing unless a creditor determines a net
tangible benefit would accrue to the borrower. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory
Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. (2007). The American Home Ownership
Preservation Act of 2007 would mandate the disclosure of mortgage broker and loan

originator compensation, as well as an assessment of the borrower's ability to repay a
mortgage in light of "property taxes, property fees, adjustment in interest rates, and property
insurance." American Home Ownership Preservation Act of 2007, S. 2114, 110th Cong.
(2007) The Fair Mortgage Practices Act of 2007 would subsidize homeownership

counseling, require licensing and disclosure requirements and limit prepayment penalties for
certain types of ARMs. Fair Mortgage Practices Act of 2007, H.R. 3012, 110th Cong.
(2007).
173. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Helping American Families
Keep Their Homes (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news
/releases/2007/12/20071206-7.html.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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more than two months in effect, only ten thousand subprime borrowers
were advised by Hope Now administrators that they were eligible for the
plan's loan workout provisions.' 76 Even the Wall Street Journaltraditionally a strong advocate of voluntary industry-sponsored reformsacknowledged the plan's "limited impact on the growing mortgage
crisis."' 177 The president of the National Community Reinvestment
Corporation, John Taylor, criticizes the Hope Now program for doing
nothing more than "postponing the foreclosure." 178 Yet despite this limited
impact, one conservative think tank considers Hope Now to be the "right
approach" because it strikes the appropriate balance between "doing
nothing . . . or allowing the government to alter thousands of private
contracts." 79 As the months progressed, administrators have been able to
reach a much larger number of at-risk homeowners. As of this writing,
180
Hope Now has worked with 2.3 million homeowners.
Hope Now's failure to make a meaningful impact on the market led the
administration and six leading lenders to create Project Lifeline, designed to
help homeowners who are more than ninety days in arrears on their
mortgages. 18 1 Project Lifeline permits qualified homeowners to stay
foreclosure proceedings for thirty days and also offers, in limited
circumstances, the opportunity to negotiate new terms.1 82 Despite being
hailed by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson as "an important new
initiative," 183 others consider it "nothing new"'184 and merely "a PR
185
stunt."
The Bush administration also launched FHASecure, offering
homeowners with non-FHA ARMs the opportunity to refinance into lowercost FHA loans.' 86 In an attempt to bolster demand, the administration also
eased rules on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 187 removing limits on the size

176. Ruth Simon & Tom McGinty, Earlier Subprime Rescue Falters-DecemberPlan
Has Done Little to Help Borrowers in Dire Circumstances, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2008, at

A3.
177. Id.
178. William Heisel, Marc Lifsher & Maura Reynolds, Defaults Slide as State Puts on the
Breaks, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at Cl.

179. David C. John & Alison Acosta Fraser, HOPE NOW:

One Step to Resolve the

Subprime Mortgage Crisis, HERITAGE FOUND. WEB MEMO, Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.

heritage.org/Research/ Regulation/upload/wm_1 742.pdf.
180. Heisel, Lifsher & Reynolds, supra note 178.
181. Simon & McGinty, supra note 176.
182. Id.

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Damian Paletta & James R. Hagerty, Lenders Step Up Efforts to Avert Foreclosures,
WALL. ST. J., Feb. 12, 2008, at A3.

186. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, FHA Secure Fact SheetRefinance Options, http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid=73,1827972&_dad=portal&schema=PORTAL (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
187. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored entities that are the largest
buyers of American home mortgages.
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of the loans the two entities can hold. 188 The move was lauded by some
Senate Democrats, who were also calling for additional steps to loosen
regulation of the lending giants. 189 President Bush also proposed, and
Congress ultimately passed, the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of
2007, amending the tax code to exclude from gross income, for a period of
90
three years, cancelled mortgage debt on a principal residence loan.1
The FHA next implemented the Hope for Homeowners program
(H4H). 19 1 Among other criteria, H4H uses means-testing to target certain
at-risk homeowners (i.e., those whose mortgage payments consume more
than 31% of their gross monthly income). 192 The program allows a
homeowner to exchange a high-cost ARM for a thirty-year fixed mortgage
backed by the FHA, and lenders will voluntarily write down the value of
the mortgage to 90% of the current value of the home (giving the
homeowner a 10% equity stake in the home). 193 In exchange, and among
other obligations, the homeowner must enter into an appreciation and equity
sharing agreement with the FHA. 194
2. Judicial Intervention
Some Democratic members of Congress have offered competing
proposals to curb the effects of the mortgage crisis that would vest
bankruptcy judges with the authority to rework the terms of a home loan
attached to a principal residence-an authority they already possess with
respect to mortgages secured by vacation homes and investment
properties. 195 The proposals have taken a variety of forms. One example is

188.
TIMES,
189.
190.

Vikas Bajaj, Regulators, Trying to Help Housing, Ease Limits on Loan Giants, N.Y.
Feb. 28, 2008, at Cl.
Id.
Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-142, 121 Stat. 1803

(excluding the amount of loan forgiveness exceeding two million dollars).
191. Federal
Housing
Administration,
HOPE
for
Homeowners,
http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid=73,7601299&_dad=portal&-schema=portal
(last
visited Nov. 17, 2008).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. The equity and appreciation sharing works on a sliding scale. If the borrower
sells the home within one year of the workout, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)

takes 100% of the equity and appreciation; after one year, the government takes 90%; after
two years, 80%, and so on. After five years, the scale stops sliding, and the FHA's share in
any equity and appreciation in the home is fixed at 50% for the life of the loan. Id.
195. The policy of not permitting a bankruptcy workout on a mortgage secured by a

primary residence is '"intended to encourage the flow of capital into the home lending
market."' Adam J. Levitin & Joshua Goodman, The Effect of Bankruptcy Strip-Down on
Mortgage Markets 4 (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Research Paper No. 1087816, 2008)
(quoting Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring)),

available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1087816. That is, by providing greater security to
investors via the foreclosure option, it is possible for lenders to offer lower interest rates on
primary residences, thereby encouraging the expansion of homeownership among borrowers
who would be otherwise unable to afford payments based on higher interest rates.
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the Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008.196
Under the Foreclosure
Prevention Act, a bankruptcy judge could, for example, rework the terms of
a mortgage secured by a primary residence. 197 A judge could change a 3/1
interest-only ARM into a thirty-year fixed mortgage at the prevailing
market rates. 198 Other proposed rewrite provisions would freeze interest
199
rates on ARMs for a number of years, halt foreclosures for ninety days,
and eliminate prepayment penalties for home mortgages. 20 0 President-elect
Obama strongly supports legislation authorizing bankruptcy judges to
modify and reduce mortgages for homeowners and will likely encourage
20 1
Congress to implement such legislation.
In a similar vein, Professor John Geanakoplos and Susan Koniak offer a
proposal under which the terms of a mortgage would be rewritten not by a
bankruptcy judge but by independent contractors with experience in local
real estate markets. 20 2 This proposal has the obvious benefit of attempting
to preserve homeownership for at least some homeowners, limiting losses
by the holder of the mortgage security, and of lessening the burden on the
federal judiciary. The proposal is also unique in its understanding of the
complex world in which mortgage-backed securities operate and how the
system can frustrate the ability of the lender and borrower to agree to revise
the terms of the loan. This proposal has the benefit of allowing mortgages
203
to be renegotiated without a full-fledged bankruptcy filing.
3. Taxpayer-Funded Responses
Members of Congress have proposed a number of other ambitious,
though moderately less contentious, remedies.
In addition to the
bankruptcy workout provision, the Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008
would provide four billion dollars in block grants to state and local
governments for mortgage counseling, acquisition and redevelopment of
blighted or abandoned properties, and the extension of financing support to

196. Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654; see also
Emergency Home Ownership and Mortgage Equity Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3609,
110th Cong. (2007).
197. Foreclosure Prevention Act, 122 Stat. 2654.
198. Id.
199. Nick Timiraos, Candidates Differ on Housing-Clinton Embraces Direct
Intervention on CertainIssues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2008, at A7.
200. American Home Ownership Preservation Act of 2008, S. 2114, 110th Cong. § 5

(2008).
201. Barack Obama and Joe Biden: The Change We Need, Protect Homeownership and
Crack Down on Mortgage Fraud, http://barackobama.com/issues/economy/index.php#home-

ownership (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
202. John D. Geanakoplos & Susan Koniak, Op-Ed, Mortgage Justice Is Blind, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at A39.
203. However, one of us is wary of sacrificing federal judicial oversight for
administrative efficiency in this situation. This concern is motivated by evidence suggesting
that some lenders targeted vulnerable groups for exotic, high-cost loans; without proper
oversight, the independent contractors could continue to exploit these at-risk homeowners.
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struggling homeowners. 204 The National Affordable Housing Trust Fund
Act of 2007 provides funding for single-family mortgage insurance and
housing counseling targeted to help low-income borrowers. 20 5 The
Expanding American Homeownership Act of 2007 (EAHA) 206 and the
FHA Modernization Act of 2007 (FMA) 20 7 are directed at bolstering the
housing market through strengthening demand. The EAHA would extend
the maximum insurable term of repayment on FHA-insured loans to forty
years (from the current thirty-five year maximum) and would reduce down
payment requirements. 208 The FMA would reduce down payment
requirements to 1.5% of the loan amount (down from the current 3%),
allow consideration of alternative credit rating information (i.e., utility, rent,
and insurance payment histories), and would introduce measures to reduce
the burden of applying for FHA loans, cited as an important factor in the
20 9
rise of more expensive, non-FHA-insured subprime lending.
After some initial equivocation regarding the appropriate level of
government intervention, 2 10 Republican Senator, and former presidential
candidate, John McCain advocated for dismantling Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac and selling each entity back to the private sector. 21 1 Senator McCain
also proposed that the government purchase the adjustable rate mortgages
of between 200,000 and 400,000 homeowners, and provide the borrowers
2 12
with more affordable, fixed-rate mortgages.
B. State and Local Responses
State and local governments have also responded to the mortgage crisis
with a host of proposals aimed at curbing the localized effects of
foreclosures, which include a reduced tax base and an increased likelihood
of blighted neighborhoods as homes are left empty. Some state and local
governments offer plans that place money or services directly into the hands
of taxpayers, some of which are targeted specifically at low- and moderateincome borrowers. 2 13 For example, Seattle offers nominal loans to help
homeowners through difficult months; 2 14 Massachusetts offers debt

204. Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654.
205. National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Act of 2007, H.R. 2895, 11 0th Cong.
(2007).
206. Expanding American Homeownership Act of 2007, H.R. 1852, 110th Cong. (2007).
207. FHA Modernization Act of 2007, S. 2338, 110th Cong. (2007).
208. Expanding American Homeownership Act, H.R. 1852.
209. FHA Modernization Act, S. 2338.
210. Maeve Reston, McCain Pitches a Mortgage Plan, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2008, at
A17.
211. Andrews, supra note 30.
212. Id.; see also JohnMcCain.com, Immediate Relief for American Families: Gas and
Food Prices, http://www.johnmccain.com/issues/jobsforamerica/relief.htm (last visited Nov.

15, 2008).
213. William Yardley, ForeclosureAid Rising Locally, as Is Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.

26, 2008, at Al.
214. Id.
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refinancing paid for through state-issued bond revenue; 2 15 and North
Carolina subsidizes the cost of providing mortgage counselors for
homeowners struggling with loan repayments. 2 16 The State of New York,
on the other hand, is considering a more active role in the mortgage market
itself, with proposals to freeze foreclosures for one year, 2 17 require lenders
to negotiate with borrowers prior to foreclosure, establish a lender's duty of
care to the borrower, and mandate that the lender make a finding of the
borrower's ability to repay the loan as a necessary predicate to extending a
2 18
home loan.
Some local governments are considering even more aggressive steps. A
San Diego City-County task force is contemplating a proposal to purchase
certain empty homes with the goal of reserving them for lower wage
workers. In a similar vein, Providence, Rhode Island officials are hoping to
transfer some foreclosed-upon properties to nonprofits with the goal of
establishing an affordable housing reserve. 2 19 In one of the more dramatic
responses, the sheriff of Cook County, Illinois simply refused to carry out
any foreclosure-related evictions because too many renters were being
evicted without any notice. 220 The office resumed evictions only after
receiving assurances that good faith renters would receive adequate notice
1
of impending evictions. 22
C. CriticalReception
Proponents of the bankruptcy workout provision tend to frame the debate
around "whether the mortgage bankers are going to win or the American
families facing foreclosure are going to win." 222 The workout provisionswhich critics call "cram-downs" 223-are
described by proponents as
narrowly tailored to target the most deserving borrowers, and necessary
responses, considering the perceived failure of President Bush's market-

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Manny Fernandez, Bill Would Set ForeclosureMoratorium, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
2008, at B3.
218. Patrick McGeehan, Spitzer to Present a Plan to Reduce Foreclosures,N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2008, at B3.
219. Michael Corkery & Ruth Simon, As Houses Empty, Cities Seek Ways to Fill the
Void, WALL ST.J., Feb. 6, 2008, at BI.
220. Azam Ahmed & Ofelia Casillas, Sheriff: I Will Stop Enforcing Evictions; Legal,
Real Estate Experts Wonder How Dart'sPromise Will Play Out, CHI.TRIB., Oct. 9, 2008, at

1.
221. Azam Ahmed, Cook County to Resume ForeclosureEvictions; Dart: Tenants to Be
Notified in Advance, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 2008, at 27.
222. Paul Kane, Republicans Block Considerationof Housing Relief Package in Senate,
WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2008, at A3 (quoting Sen. Dick Durbin).
223. Les Christie, ForeclosurePrevention Plan Under Attack, CNNMONEY.cOM, Feb. 22,
2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/2 1/real estate/cramdowns coming/.
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driven efforts. 224 Ellen Hamick of the Center for Responsible Lending
lauds the means-tests included in the proposed bankruptcy workout
provisions under which, "'if you can afford to pay your mortgage, you
don't qualify. If you can't afford to pay even after the mortgage balance is
reduced, you're not eligible."' 2 25 In response to criticism that the workout
provision would yield a substantial increase in mortgage interest rates
because of the shift in the allocation of risk between the borrower and the
lender, Professor Adam Levitin concluded, based on an analysis of
previously authorized workout provisions, that such a provision would
result in an increase of only fifteen basis points (0.15%) in home loan
226
interest rates.
On the other hand, opponents of the rewrite provisions frame the debate
as a bailout for "investors, lenders and speculators." 22 7 Opponents stress
that the cram-down provisions undermine contractual obligations and will
lead lenders and investors to "charge a higher interest rate [on new loans
and refinancings] ... more points on the mortgage and... higher down
payments." 2 28 The Mortgage Bankers Association, a group that is
admittedly "pulling out all the stops" 2 29 to prevent passage of a cram-down
and warns of a full 150
provision, contradicts Professor Levitin's prediction
2 30
basis point (1.5%) increase in mortgage rates.
Government responses that go beyond bankruptcy workout provisions
have been criticized for creating avoidable barriers to entry by
"encourag[ing] lenders to limit their lending to only the very best credit
risks." 23 1 itis argued that any direct government intervention into the
2 32
refinancing of loans, or even the outright assumption of at-risk loans,
would reward irresponsible behavior and create moral hazard. 233 That is,
borrowers and lenders will be more likely to assume imprudently high risks
in the future on the assumption-either accurate or not-that government
224. Id.; see
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233. Ronald D. Utt, President'sHomeownership Proposals Should Be Sent Back to the
Drawing Board, HERITAGE FOUND. WEB MEMO, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/

Research/Economy /upload/wm_ 1802.pdf.

2008]

PROTECTING STATUS

intervention would be forthcoming in the event of a severe economic
downturn. Even President-elect Obama initially noted that a governmentimposed freeze on foreclosures and interest rate increases would "drive
rates through the roof' for new or refinanced loans 2 34 -though as the
financial 5 crisis deepened, Obama called for a three-month foreclosure
23
freeze.
Free market advocates assert that "our economic system of letting people
make their own decisions is sustainable only if people bear the
consequences of those decisions." 236 They emphasize the unfairness of
government intervention to help overextended homeowners while ignoring
renters who chose not to expose themselves to risky loans or homeowners
who are making the sacrifices to meet their mortgage payments. 2 37 Indeed,
resentment by those who would not benefit from government intervention is
on public officials to market their efforts
quite prevalent, placing pressure
'238
as anything but a "bailout.
Proponents of direct government intervention-including many
investment banks, traditional advocates of a market unfettered by
government action-note that banks are simply "too integral a part of the
global economy" to be left "stew[ing] in the consequences of their own
folly." 239 This concern ultimately led to the successful passage of the $700

billion bailout that, as this Article goes to print, grants the Treasury
240
Secretary broad authority to respond to the credit and housing crisis.
Others stress that government intervention is necessary because
homeowners were improperly steered to higher-cost loans, that lenders
extended loans to borrowers without properly verifying the borrower's
234. Timiraos, supra note 199.
235. Carolyn Lochhead, Candidateson Offensive as Final Debate Looms; Obama Pitches
Relief: ForeclosureFreeze and Tax Breaks-but Vague on Funding, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 14,
2008, at A12.
236. Douglas Elmendorf, What Should Be Done to Help Households Facing
Foreclosure?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Nov. 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions
/2007/1 l-mortgages elmendorfiaspx.
237. Id.
238. Yardley, supra note 213.
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Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&refer-columnist
_sesit&sid=a2um5kMtLCLM; see also Damian Paletta, Worried Bankers Seek to Shift Risk
to Uncle Sam, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2008, at A2; Kathleen M. Hawley, Wall Street
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240. The risk of moral hazard is likely even greater in the wake of the government's
recent market intervention, including rescue packages for Bear Steams, Fannie Mae, Freddie
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Stabilization Act, gives the Treasury Secretary broad authority to respond to the credit and
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ability to repay, or more broadly, that the sheer number of homeowners at
risk of foreclosure compels a federal response.2 4 1
D. Status Preservationin the Face of Foreclosure
In the mortgage context, the concept of status preservation must move
back one step before it provides a helpful guidepost for discerning among
the many proposals intended to respond to the mortgage crisis. The current
mortgage mess is partially a result of unscrupulous lending practices in
which families that should have been offered traditional fixed-rate mortgage
terms were offered riskier instruments. A spokesman for Countrywide
Financial, a lender that was active in promoting exotic loans, recognized
that "'[c]onfusion and misrepresentation"' characterized the marketing of
these loans. 242 It is also a result of unsound lending practices in which
loans were extended to households that never had the means to repay them
in the first instance.
A nuanced concern for protecting homeowner status should distinguish
between the two situations. In the first, the household was duped into
accepting mortgage terms that deprived it of the financial certainty
homeownership (as opposed to a leasehold) generally offers. The various
proposals that protect homeowners in such situations are on sound footing.
However, in the second scenario, the borrower would never have become a
homeowner in the absence of admittedly irresponsible lending practices.
Preserving this homeowner's status is unlikely to work out in the long run if
the owner's finances are not stable enough to ensure future payments.
A wide variety of experts from opposing political perspectives appear to
agree that when mortgages are "underwater" and the borrower is without
means to repay the loan, both lender and borrower are better off if the
principal is modified to reflect the fair market value of the home. 24 3 The
reason for this slightly counterintuitive argument is that the lenders must
incur the cost of litigation, and even then generally recoup less than fair
market value after a foreclosure, so the lender and the borrower are better
off if the risk of default and foreclosure is minimized. 244 Ironically, then, to
prevent the mortgage crisis from casting many current homeowners out of
the ownership society, we are seeking a result that requires lenders, in
circumstances in which status preservation warrants government
intervention, to accept only the fair market value of the homes that secured
their loans. The challenge for policymakers is to achieve this result while

241. See, e.g., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SOLUTION TO HOUSING CRISIS REQUIRES
ADJUSTING LOANS TO FAIR MARKET VALUE
1 (2008), available at http://www.

responsiblelending.org/pdfs/court-supervised-modifications-would-make-large-scaeforeclosure-prevention-possible.pdf.
242. David Streitfeld, Mortgage Plan May Aid Many and Irk Others, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
31, 2008, at Al (quoting Countrywide Spokesman Rick Simon).
243. Id. (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, FDIC Chairman Sheila Blair,
and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson).
244. See Andrews & Uchitelle, supra note 40.
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minimizing barriers to entry for future aspirants to homeownership,
reducing moral hazard in the mortgage lending industry, and avoiding
unfairly shifting the burden to taxpayers (homeowners and renters alike) of
correcting for imprudent financial decisions by banks and individuals. As
this Article goes to print, policymakers are grappling with the most
effective means to achieve these competing goals. However, as we discuss
in the next part, the financial crisis has forced a reckoning as to whether
homeowner status in fact should play so central a role in our culture.
V. RECONCEPTUALIZING HOMEOWNERSHIP AND STATUS
Underlying the central assumption of an expressly status-preserving
perspective is that the ethic of homeownership has not been fundamentally
altered during the years of rapid home value appreciation. The prospect of
the creation and leveraging of wealth in the form of appreciating home
equity has undoubtedly been one of core elements of homeownership.
However, it is possible that the potential for rapid appreciation in home
values created an expectation of homeownership not as a means of
"constitut[ing] ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world" but as
nothing more than an investment vehicle. 245 Alternatively, some have
suggested that the availability of mortgage-backed loans without any down
payment and variable interest rates altered the expectation that
homeownership required financial prudence and enabled future stability. If
one can become a homeowner without having to save for a down payment
and if one's monthly costs are apt to vary with the market, how different
really is homeownership from a leasehold?
Anecdotal evidence suggests this reconceptualization has in fact occurred
on at least some level. Numerous companies now market themselves as
being in business to help homeowners "walk away" from homes with
negative equity. 24 6 Professor Ted Sinai frames the issue this way:
"Now it's like [homeowners] can do their renting from the bank, and if
house values go up, they become the owner. If they go down, you have
the choice to give the house back to the bank. You aren't any worse off
than renting and you got a chance to do extremely
well. If it's heads I
247
win, tails the bank loses, it's worth the gamble."
In addition to market-based responses to the exigencies of our volatile
housing crisis, academics have long questioned whether it is normative for
homeownership to necessitate such an all-encompassing assumption of
245. Radin, supra note 1,at 959.

246. For example, WalkAwayHome.com proclaims, "You wouldn't keep a losing or
worthless stock would you? . . .No equity? . . .[W]alk away!" Walk Away Home,
http://walkawayhome.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). Similarly, Walk Away Plan stresses
that "walking away is a viable option." Walk Away Plan, http://www.walkaway
plan.com/walkaway-plan.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) (emphasis omitted).

247. Leland, supra note 41. Professor Ted Sinai fails to mention the adverse credit risks
of foreclosure; however, it seems that these risks are outweighed at the time of purchase by

the prospect of large gains in home equity.
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investment risk. Housing values depend only to a limited degree on the
particulars of the dwelling. The same house can vary in cost by literally
millions of dollars depending upon the conditions of the neighborhood,
community, city, and state in which it is located, as well as larger systemic
factors such as interest rates and employment trends.
However,
homeownership currently requires a homeowner to assume both those risks
she can control (her roof, for example) and the many she cannot.
In her forthcoming work, Lee Ann Fennell proposes a new legal
arrangement (Homeownership 2 or H.20) that would allow prospective
homeowners to limit their investment and risk of loss to the parcel-specific
factors they can control, and to allow other investors to assume risks for
both the off-site local factors (schools, crime rates, neighborhood amenities)
and off-site systematic factors. 24 8 This legal arrangement will allow a
homeowner to choose to purchase the right to "consume" a home and the
benefits of its location in a particular neighborhood, city, and state, without
assuming the risk of loss should the value of homes in that particular
location decrease. Of course, the homeowner will not reap the benefits if
the value of the home increases for reasons related to the off-site factors,
but the homeowner will still have equity in the home based upon any
payments she makes and any improvements she provides.
While Fennell is the first to propose a new legal construct to achieve the
goal of limited investment, as she acknowledges, variations on the idea
have been percolating for decades. 24 9 Beginning in the 1970s, a few local
communities have encouraged homeowner stability by offering programs to
protect homeowners against losses in equity. Some of these programs were
created in response to specific perceived threats, such as the white flight
that bedeviled cities in the 1970s, while others are more recent attempts to
stabilize homeownership in declining cities such as Syracuse, New York. 250
H.20 and these local government equity protection programs are
animated by the goal of allowing homeowners to protect themselves from
the decline in housing values, but are different in important respects. A
community-based program is intended to promote homeowner stability and
is financed by taxpayers. By contrast, H.20 is a market-based proposal that
will allow private investors to assume the risks of the investment share of
housing values. As such, H.20 is designed to allow for greater detachment
248. See
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249. See id. (manuscript at 229 n.10, 250) (citing ANDREW CAPLIN ET AL., SHARED
EQUITY

MORTGAGES,

HOUSING

AFFORDABILITY,

AND

HOMEOWNERSHIP,

FANNIE

MAE

FOUNDATION REPORT 9-10 (2007), available at http://cess.nyu.edu/caplin/SEM2007.pdf,
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CROSSROADS (1997)). Methods for allowing homeowners to share the risk of depreciation
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appreciation mortgages and shared equity mortgages, limited equity cooperatives, and
housing partnerships. Id. (manuscript at 229). Each of these alternatives allows an
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and downside risk with investors. Id.
250. Id. (manuscript at 228-29 & nn.8-9).
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from communities once homeowners may choose a more limited
investment in the communities in which their homes are located. In so
doing, H.20, as Fennell acknowledges, necessarily allows investors'
primary goal of profit maximization to replace homeowners' mixed goals of
housing consumption and equity maximization. 25 1 This intrusion of
detached pure profit maximization has troubling implications. It threatens
to interfere with both homeowners' and a community's autonomy, and it
weakens the homeowner's connection with her community. The less
fraught connection between homeowners and communities may have
salutary effects on some of the downsides of homeowner anxiety-less
incentives for exclusivity preference and NIMBY behavior. However, as
Fennell notes, investors may assume similar positions with less connection
to the human elements of any community.
It is too early to tell whether Fennell's proposal and others' work limiting
homeownership, or market concepts such as mortgage "walkers," 252 are a
sign of a fundamental shift in the way the status of homeownership is
understood. An important question is whether the proliferation of H.20 and
the like would change the status we currently confer upon homeowners and
alter the incentives for government to encourage and facilitate
homeownership.
Such a shift may lead to a society in which the
government shifts attention away from the ownership society as an end and
more broadly to our shared interest in economic prosperity.
CONCLUSION

Government is instituted to protect property of every sort .... This being
the end of government, that alone is a just government, which impartially
253
secures to every man, whatever is his own.

Our society has a long and controversial history of protecting property
ownership. Now that the ranks of the property owners include the working
poor, as well as many black and Latino families that have long been denied
government largesse, it would be ironic indeed if government decided to
withdraw from its historic role of protecting ownership status. We think it
crucial, however, to balance the need to support those who have already
attained homeownership status with the interests of those who still aspire
for it. In addition, the excesses of an unregulated mortgage industry altered
some of the fundamental underpinnings of homeownership by eliminating
any need for prepurchase investment and establishing such variability in
monthly loan payments that households were denied any semblance of
stability and certainty.
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This Article presents two very different contexts in which
homeownership status is threatened. The first, eminent domain, presents a
clear case for government protection. The government is making an
affirmative choice to compel a transfer of ownership and is constitutionally
required to provide just compensation in exchange. Our argument is simply
that the government must compensate the household if the status increment
of their property is at risk. Existing federal law implicitly requires such
compensation by ensuring that a family receives compensation adequate to
purchase a comparable home-if state and local governments do not
voluntarily follow suit, federal courts should intervene.
The mortgage foreclosure crisis is more complex. While many families
were preyed upon by unscrupulous lenders and are deserving of
government intervention, in some instances, families bear responsibility for
agreeing to accept loans they should have realized they were financially
unable to repay. At the same time, however, rampant foreclosures will
harm not only individual families, but also whole communities. We
recommend that the panoply of proposals to respond to the crisis be
considered with goals of protecting status preservation and ensuring
sufficiently available credit for aspiring homeowners.
Finally, we suggest
some reasons to distrust proposed
reconceptualizations of homeownership. The notion of allowing families to
choose not to assume the risks of the investment component of
homeownership or to walk away from an existing loss has obvious appeal.
Our concern is that delinking a homeowner's financial stake in a
community undermines the very reason that homeownership has value
beyond the individual family's portfolio. Homeownership has long been
considered the bedrock of societal connection and stability-and the status
we confer among homeowners is largely a byproduct of this principle.

